A CASE STUDY OF DEVELOPING SHORT-CYCLE POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION IN VENEZUELA: *COLEGIOS UNIVERSITARIOS*

BY

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This report analyzes short-cycle postsecondary education in Venezuela. The study attempted to derive some insight into the rationale for the development of colegios universitarios and the relevance of this experience to other Third World nations. Colegios universitarios were unique in Latin American higher education because they had, in addition to their terminal degree programs, transfer curricula for students who wanted to enter a university and earn their baccalaureate degree. Special attention was focused on the possible democratic effect of the development of colegios universitarios on Venezuelan higher education. Foreign influence, the importance of the 1970 University Law, and the extent of support from the major Venezuelan political parties were also analyzed. The Bowles model of educational development in Third World nations was compared to the development of postsecondary short-cycle in Venezuela to ascertain if the model could be useful in planning for higher education in other developing nations.

The following conclusions were reached. Colegios universitarios are helping to democratize Venezuelan higher education. Foreign influence in the development of the colegios universitarios came mainly from the United States' comprehensive community college model. The two major political parties in Venezuela supported the creation and continue to support the development of colegios universitarios. The 1970 University Law was a catalyst in establishing colegios universitarios. The development of Venezuelan higher education does parallel the Bowles model at stages three and five. The use of the model may be helpful for educational planners in Third World nations by suggesting possible responses for increased numbers of secondary graduates at the post-secondary level.

The development of colegios universitarios, although uniquely Venezuelan in many ways, may serve as a guide for other developing nations contemplating short-cycle postsecondary education.

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Rationale for the Study

Industrialized nations throughout the world have long realized that social and economic strength rests fundamentally on the productive capacity of their people. Having developed their primary and secondary systems of education, most democratic industrialized nations for various reasons are now attempting to expand higher education by making it more accessible. One popular solution to the access issue has been the development of short-cycle postsecondary higher education.

In 1982, short-cycle to three-year postsecondary higher education was a world-wide phenomenon. Short-cycle non-university parallel programs included vocational and technical training lasting from two weeks to several months. The longer two- to three-year university parallel programs included preprofessional curricula leading to professional degrees at a college or university and the general education component of other academic degree programs. Terminal degree programs were also offered, usually lasting less than three years, allowing students to enter immediately the job market (OECD, 1973, pp. 16-17, 73). India combines the two types of post-secondary higher education in its College of Vocational Studies at Delhi University which offers diverisified, non-traditional and vocational subjects as well as general subjects (Kintzer, 1979b, p. 71). In Yugoslavia, Visja Solas began in 1960 offering first-cycle technical courses and other programs to fill the void between secondary schools and university graduates (Kintzer, 1979a, pp.2-23). Similar institutions were called community colleges in Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and England. They

concentrated on vocational/technical courses and did not have transfer curriculum (Kintzer, 1979b, pp. 70-72, Lynch, 1978, pp. 80-82). Elsewhere, Normay had regional or district colleges with short-cycle university level programs and vocational training, both with local community orientation (Belding, 1971a, pp. 162-164; 1971b, pp. 44-45; Kintzer 1979b, pp. 73-74). The United States has incorporated the short-cycle idea into its postsecondary higher education system more completely than any other nation. In the Fall of 1981 the comprehensive community college system in the United States enrolled almost half of all students in higher education, 4.89 million students (AACJC, 1982). These institutions included vocational, occupational, and remedial education as well as university parallel, adult, and continuing education curricula (Medsker & Tillery, 1971, pp. 57-70).

Latin America has also developed short-cycle postsecondary educational programs. Martorana (1981) states that generally these nations have used two approaches, one where separate institutions were created and the other where the short-cycle idea was incorporated into the university system. The two exceptions to these general classifications were Peru where manpower training takes place within the secondary schools and Chile where a separate institution at the secondary level performed this function. Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico, and Costa Rica have created independent institutions to train students for postsecondary advanced skilled programs. In Colombia these were called instituto superior, técnico, or universitario and offered two and three-year non-university technical or professional training. There was an attempt by Colombians in the late 1960's to create comprehensive transfer institutions but those changed within two to three years into regional universities (ICFES, 1977, p. 58; Jacobsen, 1968, pp. 9-13). In Costa Rica, the two short-cycle institutions

that existed were named institutos colegios, loosely translated as community colleges, but were mainly technical/vocational colleges (Van de Laat, 1979, p. 111). In Venezuela there were the institutos universitarios politécnicos, pedagógicos, and de technología, and the colegios universitarios, university colleges. These colegios universitarios offered programs in teacher education, administration, and the general studies curriculum (cíclo básico) for transfer to the university. In addition, the Instituto Nacional de Cooperación Educativa (INCE) offered vocational training at the secondary level but has now started to offer postsecondary higher technical degrees for middle-level occupations (Ministerio de Educación Nacional, 1974, pp. 231-287; Yelvington, 1979, pp. 133-139).

Those nations that incorporated short-cycle curriculum in their university system included Chile, Dominican Republic, Panama, and Venezuela (Martorana, 1981). Although Chile, as mentioned earlier, did have some skilled manpower training taking place at the secondary level, it also had 64 regional campuses of the eight national universities providing short-cycle training granting subprofessional degrees such as administrative technician, artistic designer, librarian, and social service assistant (McGinn and Toro, 1978, p. 881). In the Dominican Republic the national university Pedro Henriquez Urena through its branches was creating a short-cycle program to prepare agricultural technicians in such areas as animal husbandry. In Panama the University of Panama also offered short-cycle programs through five regional centers. Venezuela's Open University and Simón Rodríguez University offered short-cycle curriculum programs through branch campuses, television, and other non-traditional delivery systems (Martorana, 1981).

By 1980, Venezuela had become a nation of some importance. It was the third-largest exporter of oil in the world. It provided six percent of the imported oil for the United States in 1980. In Latin America, Venezuela had the highest income per capita in 1980 (Kurian, 1978, p. 1631; "Week in Review," 1981, Pam Am's world guide, 1980, p. 934). It was a founding member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and one of the few democratic republics, at least since 1958, in Latin America (Cooper, 1979, p. 157; Valente, 1979, p. 5). Venezuela has also become a leader in the Third World through its activities in several international organizations. It is a member of the Group of Seventy-Seven of the United Nations, and is one of the major spokesmen for the Third World in the "North-South Dialogue." Venezuela is also committed to the doctrine of the New International Order as outlined by the United Nations Council on Trade and Development. It is involved with the concept of Latin American integration especially through the Andean Pact and the Latin American Economic System and constantly tries to improve relations between the United States and other Latin American Nations (Blutstein, 1977, p. 206; Valente, 1979, p. 17-18). Its influence in the Third World is clearly noted, especially in the Caribbean Basin, by a recent comment by Eric Williams, the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, "The Caribbean is being recolonized, this time by Venezuela" (Valente, 1979, p. 21).

Venezuela has also committed itself to developing its educational systems. In 1949-50, fewer than 500,000 students were enrolled in schools at all levels. By the last year of the Pérez Jiménez dictatorship in 1958, total enrollments had increased to only 845,000. Two years after the fall of Jiménez in 1972-73, the school population had grown to over

2.5 million (Ruscoe, 1977, p. 259). This growth continued into the 1970's based on a population that had nearly doubled from 1959 to 1973. The education budget had also increased over 450 percent from 1958 to 1973 (accounting for inflation) and absorbed 19.1 percent of governmental expenditures in 1973 as compared to slightly less than 10 percent in 1958 (Note 1). By 1980, the total educational budget was Bs.9,098,600,000 ($2,120,885,000 @Bs.4.29 = $1.00) and constituted 12.5 percent of the national budget. Out of that, 4.85 percent or Bs.4,589,800,000 ($1,069,883,400) of the national budget was allocated to higher education (Note 2).

Expansion at the postsecondary level has been impressive. Prior to 1958, there were three national autonomous universities and two private universities. In 1980, there were 15 public universities, six private universities, six teachers' colleges, four polytechnical institutes, and 38 institute and university colleges (CNU/OPSU, 1980, pp. 15-17). The most extensive expansion came at the postsecondary short-cycle level starting in 1971. That year President Rafael Caldera issued Executive Decree Number 792 creating the system of university colleges or colegios universitarios (CU) and technical institutes (Armengol, 1977, p. 114; Heres, 1979, p. 94; Yelvington, 1979, p. 133). These CU are unusual in Latin American higher education. They provide terminal two- to three-year degrees that generally are divided into two semesters of cíclo básico or general education with the remaining four semesters designed to train the student in a particular vocational field. Another option for the student upon finishing the CU degree is to transfer to a university and complete the baccalaureate (Licenciatura) degree. This transfer component is unique in Latin America. The cíclo básico offered at CU is also unusual in Latin American higher education. If

there are any basic professional requirements in a university curriculum, they would be provided by the student's professional school or college (e.g., general mathematics requirements for the college of engineering or medicine are provided by that college, not by a university college of general studies or a college of liberal arts and sciences)(Yelvington, 1979, p. 137). Costa Rica did have a system of two-year higher technical institutions but it did not include a transfer curriculum (Van de Laat, 1979, p. 111). Colombia started out with a two-year transfer system based on the comprehensive United States model but converted all of its university colleges into regional universities (ICFES, 1977, p. 58; Jacobsen, 1968, pp. 9-13). A review of the literature indicates no other post-secondary short-cycle system that has a transfer curriculum to university programs, as do colegios universitarios, exists in Latin America.

The general expansion at all levels of Venezuelan public education is responsible in part no doubt for the development of colegios universitarios. But growth does not explain totally this unique system and the evident commitment of the government. One explanation may have been the concern of the government for the continued growth of the economy. The universities were not producing the types of graduates perceived as essential by the government for the economy, specifically mid-level managers and higher trained technicians. The CU with its vocationally oriented programs produced graduates with the técnico superior degree who are qualified to be mid-level managers and higher technicians (Yelvington, 1979, p. 135). Another possible explanation for the development of CU were the demands mainly from university students that the higher education system expand to accommodate greater numbers of lower-income groups (Arnove, 1977, pp. 205-213). The CU would aid in providing for this demand by making higher education more accessible to these non-traditional students. This

would be accomplished by establishing CU in convenient geographical locations and in sufficient numbers around the country so that the CU would be more accessible and less costly to attend than an out of town university.

The demand for higher education is clearly evident as noted by some recent educational statistics. In 1979-1980, 99,342 secondary students were qualified to attend a university and other institutions of higher education by preregistration procedures as compared to 91,064 in 1975-1976 and 64,342 in 1973-1974. Because of admission procedures in some of the institutions and simply because of a lack of space mainly in the universities, only 60,843 students of the 1979-1980 total were able to matriculate in institutions of higher education. The universities attracted the majority of eligible students with 37,056 students or 72.88 percent of the total eligible. The colegios universitarios attracted 4,700 or 9.24 percent of those students eligible for postsecondary higher education. The remaining students were attending various other institutions including institutos de tecnologiá, de politécnico, and de pedagógico (Armitano, Note 2; Brito & Garcia, Note 1).

Yelvington (1979, p. 133) indicates that foreign influence may have been significant in the development of colegios universitarios. He notes that in 1971 when the CU were first contemplated, the government dispatched a team of ten Venezuelan educators to the United States to obtain briefings on the community colleges of California and other states. These visits by Venezuelan educators to the United States continued as the development of CU progressed in Venezuela.

The development of this system has been supported by all major parties. The enabling legislation was forthcoming during the Caldera administration, 1968-1973, when the Christian Democratic Party (COPEI, Comité por

Organizacion Politica y Electoral Independiente) was in power. But the major expansion of the system occurred during the Pérez administration, 1973-1979, of the Democratic Action Party (AD, Acción Democratica) (Valente, 1979, p. 16; Yelvington, 1979, p. 133).

It was also during the Caldera administration, after some original efforts by the previous Leoni administration (AD), that the 1970 University Law was implemented. Before 1970, the administrations of both Leoni and Caldera were concerned about the power of universities, their virtual monopoly over higher education, their faculties, and student groups, especially at the Central University of Venezuela (UCV). The university campuses were perceived as havens for radicals and powerful student groups who could easily disrupt university classes with strikes (Arnove, 1977, pp. 205-213; Monroy, Note 3). The development of CU, coupled with the 1970 Law, may have been part of the government's overall plan to address the perceived problems associated with the universities. With CU, students and faculty are on campuses that are smaller and not autonomous lessening political activity and fragmenting student groups. The CU, with other short-cycle institutions, would for the first time diminish the virtual monopoly over higher education enjoyed by the universities before 1970.

Finally, another explanation of the creation of colegios universitarios in the context of development may be found in Frank H. Bowles' notion that there are stages for developing higher education in Third World nations (Bowles, 1977, pp. 440-460). The Bowles model was the only such model found by the author of this study that addressed the developing of higher education in Third World nations. The framework Bowles used in creating his patterns of educational development is based on extensive involvement with international higher education. He was Planning Officer of Haile Selassie I University in Ethiopia from 1966-1972 and was a consultant to

the study Higher Education and Social Change. In his model Bowles postulated that educational systems must go through certain stages of growth before they are ready for new ideas and methods. These are known as patterns of educational development and include five stages.

Stage I. The formation of a basic national educational system is completed during this stage including primary schools, vocational, teacher training, and preuniversity secondary schools including one-to-three-year nondegree postsecondary programs. Ten percent or more of the potential student population is provided for.

Stage II. The national university with undergraduate studies is formed with first professional degrees. No graduate studies or research programs are formed at this stage. Possible parallel programs in higher technical training may be offered outside the university.

Stage III. A national political movement to generalize the baisc national educational system as described in Stage I to reach up to 50 percent of the 6 to 12 age group is accomplished.

Stage IV. The maturation of the university occurs with emerging graduate and research programs relating to national problems and full faculty training in some fields.

Stage V. Higher education in this stage extends its role, reaching out to communities, developing new methods of educational delivery, and creating national service programs to meet political necessities.

According to Bowles, Stage III is crucial for it is in this stage that a nation moves from an elitist system towards universal and possibly mass higher education (e.g., the United States experience with community colleges). And as indicated by postwar experiences in developed nations, this process is politically irreversible. Bowles cautions that even though his patterns of development should be used as a guide, they are

not to be considered sacrosanct. No doubt there are nations that will develop somewhat differently as described in each stage, and the differences between stages may be blurred, but the general concepts of the model remain valid.

It is not clear why the system of colegios universitarios were created. But they do exist with their transfer programs and in the milieu of Latin American higher education and for that matter the Third World, this is unique and unusual. Venezuela's experience then may be useful as a way to understand the process of developing higher education in the Third World nations. If Venezuela's experience were applicable to other Third World nations it would not be an insignificant matter considering that such nations comprise 49 percent of the world's surface and 51 percent of the world's population, generally under the age of 25 (Kurian, 1978, pp. 1630-40). In addition, the development of CU may also demonstrate the validity of Bowles' stages of development which have not yet been substantiated beyond his original study.

Given the significance of Venezuela's unique development of colegios universitarios and prominent position of leadership in Latin America and the Third World, it is appropriate that one take a look at the development of these institutions in order to provide data for educational scholars and practitioners who may be working in this area in the future.

Statement of the Problem

The focus of this study will be on analyzing the development of public short-cycle postsecondary education in the form of colegios universitarios in Venezuela during the decade 1970-1980. Specifically the following questions will be addressed:

1. To what extent was the development of colegios universitarios a means by which Venezuela attempted "to democratize higher education,"* that is to provide more education for more people and to provide an alternative type of higher education in lieu of traditional university professional education?

2. To what degree did foreign influence have a role in the development of the colegios universitarios?

3. How prevalent was the support of the major political parties for the development of colegios universitarios and to what extent did the 1970 University Law affect this development?

4. Was the development of Venezuelan higher education consistent with the Bowles model?

Delimitations

The expansion of public short-cycle postsecondary higher educational institutions with emphasis on the development of colegios universitarios during the decade of 1970-1980 was included in this study. The on-site visits included three colegios universitarios in the metropolitan Caracas area selected from the seven in the country.

Data germane to the development of these institutions were collected through an extensive search of official government documents, related material, and interviews with selected knowledgeable persons. Documentary sources included publications from the Ministry of Education, selected CU, and other relevant agencies. Interviews were conducted with persons considered knowledgeable about the development of CU.

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*Based on documentation and interviews obtained in Venezuela, the concept "to democratize higher education" means expanding opportunity by increasing the availability of postsecondary higher education to a broader diversity of citizens."

The development of the Venezuelan CU was compared to the Bowles model. Special attention was given to stages three and five of the model where new and unique ways of delivering higher education develop.

Many of the research limitations normally associated with a case study approach are evident in this study. The author depended on the completeness and accuracy of documentation regarding internal and external validity. To the extent that these documents were not complete or totally accurate, this study is less than it should be. In conducting interviews, the author again relied on the accuracy of perception and recall of the interviewee who also may or may not have had a vested interest and may have been highly opinionated about the subject. As delineated in a later section of this chapter, the study design adopted for this research attempted to include elements which minimized the weaknesses mentioned. However, the author acknowledges that certain weaknesses may remain, e.g., case study approach, lack of randomized selection strategy for those to be interviewed, which suggests that the findings and interpretations emerging from this research should be generalized with extreme caution.

Assumptions

It was assumed that those government officials and other knowledgeable and influential observers that were interviewed did have useful and characteristic perceptions which enabled them to discern and distinguish basic issues and major elements associated with the development of colegios universitarios. It was further assumed that such insights were either expressed and recorded in the past or were communicated during the interviews.

Definition

In this study colegios universitarios (CU) refers to part of Venezuela's short-cycle postsecondary higher educational system that offers career terminal preparation for education, administration, and some technical programs usually lasting three years and first-cycle programs providing the basic cycle or general studies component plus other selected course work for transfer to university programs (Heres, 1979, p. 94; Yelvington, 1979, pp. 134-37).

Procedures

Selection of Nation and System to be Studied

There were several criteria met theoretically and practically by chosing the colegios universitarios in Venezuela. The CU were isolated for research attention because of the absence of such a study as discussed in the "justification" section. In addition, the development of these institutions aided in substantiating the Bowles model.

Venezuela was chosen as noted previously because of its prominent position in Latin America and the Third World as well as its apparent commitment to the idea of postsecondary short-cycle education. Tangentially related was the lack of scholarly literature on Venezuelan higher education in general and short-cycle postsecondary education specifically.

A final consideration was that the creation of CU has been a recent phenomenon. Because of the recency, then, data loss and deterioration were minimized.

Study Design and Data Sources

For this research project, a case study design was employed to isolate the development of colegios universitarios in the milieu of Venezuelan higher education. This design incorporated elements of both the historical and retrospective survey approaches suggested by Fox's (1969) typology. The historical approach was utilized to put the case study of CU in the context of Venezuelan political, social, economic, and educational history. The retrospective survey was incorporated into the design to expand and detail the historical data and the case study.

Three categories for data sources were explored to provide for this study.

Category-1. Related research on higher education and its development in Latin America and Venezuela specifically.

Category-2. Official documents about CU in Venezuela obtained here and in Venezuela including: (a) journal, magazine, and newspaper documents; (b) government documentation and records in Venezuela; and (c) unpublished documents obtained in Venezuela.

Category-3. New factual and opinion data concerning the subject was gathered by means of in-depth interviews with Ministry of Education officials, directors of CU, and selected observers about the development of CU. The criterion for the selection of observers to be interviewed was their probable knowledge of and possible influence upon the development of CU and was ascribed mainly on the basis of positions held, e.g., students, political influentials, educational officials, and other interested observers.

Data Collection and Instrumentation

The initial phase of data collection was a review of the related research specified in the "Category 1" classification. The purpose of this review was to acquire background information for use as a conceptual foundation for the proposed research project. The review also provided realistic expectations for the case study and an interview guide.

The interview guide (see Appendices B and C) was designed to ask questions that were open-ended to introduce points of discussion and new themes or unexpected topics. This was done by constructing the questions so as to insure the exploration of all pertinent topics suggested by a review of the literature.

The next phase of data collection employed essentially the historical approach in investigating documentation as noted in the "Category-2" classification. The data acquired here were to place the development of colegios universitarios in the social, economic, political, and educational milieu of Venezuela. Based on the data collected during this phase, some modification of the interview guide was necessary but it was done so that all those interviewed by the author responded to the identical interview guides.

The interview guide was developed from the review of the literature. The instrument was tested in a pilot interview with a former employee of both a colegio universitario and a university to determine the usefulness of the instrument. The resulting interview guide reflects revisions or refinements suggested by the pilot interview.

The purpose of the interviews was to elicit the types of data as described in "Category-3" classification. This final phase of data collection involved interviews with knowledgeable persons such as the Vice-Minister of Superior Education, the Assistant to the Director of

Middle Education, the former Director of University Planning, a former Minister of Education, Directors of three colegios universitarios, and other selected observers, including students, relevant politicians, and those suggested by the aforementioned.

The collection of "Category-1" data was accomplished before leaving to continue the project in Venezuela. Data as described in "Category-2" and "Category-3" were collected in Venezuela. This was accomplished with a month long stay in Caracas during February-March, 1981.

The first two days in Caracas were spent in making appropriate contacts so as to collect data as outlined in "Category-2." In addition, appointments were made at this time for interviews and collection of "Category-3" data. Mrs. Graciela Moore, an official of the Open University and longtime Venezuelan professional in education, was invaluable in setting up appointments for me and helping me collect necessary documentation. Contacts had been made with officials of the Ministry of Education and with the Embassy of the United States in order to get interviews with the proper officials. The next three weeks were spent on the interviews with official and other knowledgeable observers. The last week was used to terminate the interview process and collect whatever other data were pertinent to the subject. The author stayed with an English speaking Venezuelan family who were familiar with CU and the proposed study. The on-site investigation in Venezuela ended in March when the author returned to the United States.

Comment on Study Design

The historical research method has a major limitation which in this study design is lessened by the use of the retrospective survey. In historical research the investigator is able to study only that portion of the universe of original data which was survived to the time of the

investigation. The researcher has no ability to create new data and is forced to accept the data surviving whether or not representative. The retrospective survey interview allows the investigator to expand and more fully detail existing data.

The retrospective survey design has a major limitation in the reliability and accuracy of the recollections elicited. This may occur because of bias, misunderstanding, or distortions of recall on the part of the respondent possibly caused by the mere passage of time. Because of the study design, this limitation will be minimized. Interviews will be compared to ascertain accuracy and obtain consensus on events. Whenever possible, interviews will also be compared with historical data for congruence.

With such checks as outlined incorporated into the study design, there has been every effort to minimize those limitations of the historical and retrospective survey methods. Although these attempts to control sources of error are not as effective as desired, they do reduce the weaknesses typically associated with case study research.

Organization of the Study

Chapter 2 utilizes documentation obtained in Venezuela and describes the development of higher education there. Because the development of CU is part of the culmination of a series of events only understood by analyzing the history of Venezuelan higher education, Chapter 2 emphasizes the economic, political, and social influences upon higher education from colonial times until the present. Chapter 3 describes the development of CU over the past decade and incorporates the interviews obtained in Venezuela to formulate a consensus about the events relating to that development. Chapter 4 takes the descriptive data from Chapters 2 and 3

and analyzes it in the light of the four research questions formulated for this study. Chapter 5 provides a summary of the findings of the study and an exploration of their implications relative to higher education policymakers in Latin America, other Third World nations, and international organizations as well as the need for further research.

CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

In this chapter the development of Venezuelan higher education will be analyzed from colonial times to the present in order to document events that influenced the creation and growth of short-cycle post-secondary education generally and colegios universitarios specifically.

According to the former Venezuelan Minister of Education Monroy (Note 3), Angel Grisanti's three stages of Venezuelan education are accurate demarcations of the major periods of its earlier development. Grisanti's three stages are the colonial period, from the stirrings of education to the year 1810, when Venezuela slowly began its movement towards independence from Spain; the second period from 1810 to the historic year, 1870, when free, compulsory education was made the law of the land; and the third period from 1870 to the late 1950's when Venezuela became a viable democracy. Venezuelan educational development from 1960 to the present will constitute the final stage to document the explosive development of Venezuelan education with the advent of democracy.

The Colonial Period: 1530-1810

Venezuela was one of the least regarded of Spain's colonies for most of the colonial period (Herring, 1968, p. 513). It lacked gold and silver as well as a large indigenous population that could be enslaved or forced to pay tribute as in Mexico and Peru. Consequently, economic and population growth was very slow during the 16th and 17th centuries, which also translated into political insignificance for

Venezuela. During most of the colonial period, the area was ruled by the Vice-Royalty of New Granada and its Viceroy or Vice-King appointed by and loyal to the Spanish King. New Granada included not only what is now Venezuela, but Panama and Colombia, with the administrative center in Bogotá, Colombia (Herring, 1968, p. 161). In 1577, Venezuela became a smaller administrative unit--a Captaincy-General whose officials were also appointed by and directly responsible to the King, allowing it a measure of autonomy (Bushnell, Note 4).

Local self-government or autonomy never developed in the Spanish colonies as compared to the North American English colonies. The possible exceptions to this general statement were the cabildos or city councils. Not only did some cabildos acquire a measure of independence during the colonial period, but without exception, they provided most of the leadership for the independence movement, especially in Caracas.

The institution of the cabildo helps to explain the importance of cities in Latin American culture and for the purposes of this study, why institutions of higher education are always located in urban centers (i.e., unlike the United States where universities were in many instances founded in small towns, Gainesville, Stanford, Berkeley, Chapel Hill, etc.). The Spaniards, true to Roman tradition, had long exalted the city, or more accurately the city-state, with a considerable area dominated by the municipal center; and Spanish America followed the same tradition. This magnification of the city was to a degree unfamiliar to those of English heritage. Bernard Moses in Herring (1968, p. 157), describes the difference: "In the English colonies of America the town grew up to meet the needs of the inhabitants of the country; but in the Spanish colonies the population of the country grew to meet the needs of the town." It was therefore consonant with Spanish heritage

that Columbus, after landing upon Hispaniola, should lay out the city-state of Navidad, that Balboa should found Darien, Panama, that Cortés should establish Veracruz, Mexico, that Pizarro should celebrate victory in Peru by erecting the City of Kings--Lima, and that Validivia, while still threatened by the Araucanians, should organize the city of Santiago, Chile (Herring, 1968, p. 157).

Venezuela remained during most of the colonial period a largely isolated, avoided, and unknown colony until 1700 when the Bourbon dynasty was introduced in Spain. Previously, Spain had depended on the precious metals mined in Mexico, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia to fill the treasury. As these mines produced less and less revenue, and as the Crown became less effective in enforcing royal monopolies, the Bourbons created monopolistic companies modeled after the profitable East India Company in England. A number of these companies were founded between 1714 and 1757. The most successful was the Caracas Company chartered in 1728. It turned Venezuela's haciendas into plantations producing cotton, indigo, tobacco, chocolate, and dyewoods. The Caracas Company also encouraged the slave trade, caused by the labor demands of a cacao boom which gave the colony the dubious distinction of having the third largest concentration of slaves in Latin America behind Brazil and Cuba (Herring, 1968, p. 193). From 1700 until independence in 1810, Venezuela was a developing, dynamic, and growing colony.

Educationally, as well as economically, the colony developed slowly. The first known school was installed at Coro in 1560 by Fray Pedro de Agreda, the second bishop of that diocese. The curriculum included Spanish grammar, morals, and the rudiments of Latin. Grisanti in Monroy (Note 3) commented that "all instruction at the time was carried on by clergy who provided private, free lessons in convents and parish churches."

It was not until 1591 that the first primary school was established. Secondary schools were instituted in the middle of the following century; some were religious seminaries; others were the standard academies of the time. One of the latter, the Seminario de Lima, established in Caracas, was the forerunner of Venezuela's first university. After almost 75 years of petitions, the Spanish crown finally chartered the Seminario in 1721 and renamed it the Royal and Pontifical University of Santiago de Leon de Caracas. Its purposes were to provide education for meritorious but impoverished white students and to develop a better trained clergy. Its first curriculum included beginning and advanced philosophy, church law, legal institutes, moral theology, general sciences taught in Latin, literature, ecclesiastical philosophy of the Dominican order, medicine, and essentials of grammar (Monroy, Note 3).

The university granted a total of 2,270 degrees between 1725 and 1810, the year the wars of independence began. Included were 1,625 lycée degrees or bachilleres (high school diploma plus one year of university work). Some 1,028 of them were granted in philosophy, 170 in law, and 33 in medicine. Another 328 were the first equivalent to the B.A. degree, the licenciatura. Eligibility for degree examination in the university depended in part on the rector's determination that the applicant was "legitimate" and "clean of all bad races" (Silvert & Reissman, 1976, p. 143). By the time of independence, it had become possible for more affluent pardos (mixed black, Indian, and/or white blood) to buy certificates testifying to their whiteness (Silvert & Reissman, 1976, pp. 142-3).

One final observation by Gil Fourtoul, a Venezuelan historian in Silvert and Reissman (1976, p. 142) refers to the tone of education

received at the University of Caracas just before independence. According to him, the university was a focal point of the conservative ideas of the colony and was imbued with a conservative spirit which retarded the growth of the more progressive ideas from European universities. An example of this conservatism was an article published in The Gazette of Caracas on February 19, 1811, concerning the inquisition and divine right of kings, which was approved by the full university council and the archbishop, entitled Politico-religious intolerance vindicated. The article read in part:

> The authority of kings is derived from heaven; the persons of kings even though they be tyrants are inviolable, and although their will is not always to be confused with that of God himself, they should always be respected and obeyed. The Inquisition is a necessary and legitimate tribunal; there is no recourse against the general corruption other than politico-intolerance.

Colonial education at all levels was slow to develop and was almost totally controlled by the Church. Curriculum was mainly dominated by scholasticism, and the student population was limited to the wealthy and "pure of blood."

The notion of education at the time reflected the hierarchical social system by allowing only a privileged few to attend, reinforcing the distinction between the man of letters and the man who worked with his hands. This distinction between mental and manual labor remained ingrained in the value system and affected the education system.

As previously noted, most university graduates received their degree in law or philosophy, ignoring technical and scientific fields at the university level. Curricula at the primary and intermediate levels remained geared to university education and omitted what is known today as vocational or occupational education (Blutstein, 1977, p. 79).

The 1810-1870 Period

In the first phase of this period, Venezuela was struggling to throw off the yoke of Spanish rule and achieve its independence and there was a consequent decline in concern for educational matters.

The population in 1810 is estimated to have been 900,000 people: 20.3 percent white, Creoles (Venezuelan-born whites) and Iberians; 16.3 percent blacks; 45 percent pardos; 11.7 percent Indians; and 6.7 percent others (Silvert & Reissman, 1976, p. 143). By 1830, the population had decreased by at least one-fourth, due to the wars for independence and subsequent local wars (Herring, 1968, p. 514).

Throughout the wars, Venezuela supplied much of the manpower for the armies and two of its most famous leaders, Simón Bolivar, the libertador of Latin America, and José Antonio Páez, a llanero (pardo from the interior plains of Venezuela) general. They collaborated during the period 1817-1820 and won a decisive victory at Carabobo near Lake Maracaibo in June, 1821. This battle assured the independence of Venezuela although the last royalist garrisons were not dislodged by Páez from Maracaibo and Puerto Cabello until 1823 (Lynch, 1973, p. 218).

Even during these chaotic times, Bolivar took time out to address problems of educational development. As soon as independence was declared in 1811, Bolivar initiated a series of decrees proclaiming compulsory and free primary education in all regions. The constitution then written envisaged a federation of seven provinces with a weak central government. The various provincial constitutions called for the development of arts and mechanics and for the education of children (Burroughs, 1974, p. 19).

As the war for independence drew to a close, Bolivar attempted to unite the old Vice-Royalty of New Granada and form a new independent Gran

Colombia including Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador. But, as Silvert and Reissman (1976, p. 144) point out, Bolivar's army of llaneros, mercenaries, and Creoles had little reason to remain loyal after the Spanish were defeated. With the demise of the army and consequently his main source of power in Venezuela, Bolivar was left without a political future. Within a short time the ideals that he had hoped would germinate--the balance between central and regional government, the formation of Gran Colombia, and new educational systems--had all substantially fallen apart. Bolivar died poor, alone, and exiled from his own country in 1830 at the age of 47 (Lynch, 1973, p. 293).

Although Bolivar and his associates may have failed in creating concrete monuments to their efforts, the influence they had in education was extensive. As Blumstein (1977, p. 80) and Burroughs (1974, p. 18) note, the American and French revolutions had a profound impact on these insurgents. Bolivar was especially affected by his tutor, Simón Rodríguez, who was an admirer of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. These influences, particularly the French, left their mark on the educational system as they developed in Venezuela through presidential decrees and various federal and regional constitutions. The degree of centralization, the structure of liceos and normal schools, concern with matters in verbal, logical, and argumentative form rather than in empirical pragmatic form, the existence in teachers' schedules of separate periods of responsibility for discipline, and the heavy reliance upon examinations are French, rather than British, German, or North American (Burroughs, 1974, p. 18).

After the death of Bolivar, until 1870, Venezuela had a succession of strong men or caudillos overthrowing one another and claiming the presidency. There was no national ruling group able to assume preeminence and even the caudillos had to share power with regional rulers, the

caciques. José Antonio Páez became Venezuela's "president" and was the first in a string of caudillos who ruled the country for a century. The alliance of the caudillo, who in reality generally controlled only Caracas, and conservative elements of society did not reimpose the pre-independence power of the Church or professionalize the army into a viable political force. Bonilla (1970, p. 46) states that the Páez regime, which governed intermittently from 1830 to 1863, with its emphasis in civilism, secularism, and legal egalitarianism (constitutionalism) gained the reputation as a golden period of Venezuelan "democracy." That is, several caudillos and caciques could participate in the government and not be dominated by the church or an organized army.

As for educational matters between 1830--1870, necessary structural bases were slowly being laid. Monroy (Note 3) observes that in 1827 an Under-Office of Education was established. In 1830, provinces officially retained the responsibility for the development and organization of primary jurisdiction over secondary education. Also in 1830, the Office of Primary Instruction began to function.

A Code of Public Instruction was issued in 1843 specifying the division of education between schools, colleges, and universities. In 1854, education was made the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior and of Justice (Burroughs, 1974, p. 20). It was also during this time that more lay instructors were entering the teaching profession and curriculum was being steadily expanded away from the predominantly ecclesiastical nature of the colonial period (Monroy, Note 3).

Even though some structural progress was made, the everyday state of the system was less than desirable. A report by the Minister of the Interior and Justice to Congress in 1849 pointed out several deficiencies. He noted that for a nation in the midst of forests in the center of the

tropical zone which counted as part of its wealth agricultural products and livestock, it was unbelievable that there were no classes in botany, physics or chemistry applied to agriculture, veterinary medicine, or in any natural science related to Venezuela's climate, territory, or products.

The year before, José María Vargas, the head of the Office of Public Education, noted that only 121 of the country's 537 parishes had a primary school. Almost all were poorly staffed with teachers who lacked appropriate training. Secondary schools had been established in only 12 localities and the only one for females was in Caracas. Vargas said only one of every 114 school-aged children in Venezuela was schooled as compared to one of every 12 in Holland, and one of every 13 in Austria. As a solution to the educational problems, he proposed the establishment of universal free and obligatory primary schooling supported by revenues earmarked for that purpose in accord with population changes. The instruction was to be provided by teachers trained in normal schools (Silvert & Reissman, 1976, p. 145).

The 1870-1958 Period

This period in Venezuelan history is marked by the dictatorships of Antonio Guzmán Blanco, Juan Vicente Gómez, and Pérez Jiménez, with a brief democratic respite between the last two. Guzmán Blanco was a liberal caudillo who was called a civilizing autocrat by some, but criticized by most. He was successful in subjugating the ruling elite and according to Bonilla (1970, pp. 52-53) was a legendary egomaniac. But, he issued the most important educational legislation of the last century, mandating obligatory elementary education. This statute of June 27, 1870, was one of the first governmental acts of the newly established dictatorship. The statute also required public instruction to be free and the responsibility of the public authorities (Lemmo, 1977, p. 19). Priority was

to be given the subjects of morality, reading and writing of Spanish, practical arithmetic, the metric system, and the compendium of the Federal Constitution. Although the decree was to have been carried out by 1874, 135 of the 335 primary schools that were to have been established by the legislation were still nonexistent. In 1877, Caracas had only 1,622 students in primary schools, usually in one-room school houses. At that same time, there was a national total of 22,669 students attending primary schools (Lemmo, 1977, pp. 62-5) as compared to 8,000 in 1870 (Burroughs, 1974, p. 23). The first national census in 1873 put the population at around 1,785,000 (Figueroa, 1966, p. 310).

Along with the increase in student population, additional changes were made during this period. Religious instruction was no longer a part of the required curriculum in public schools; and the Ministry of Education was created in 1881, the first true attempt at administrative specialization and the beginning of centralization (Monroy, Note 3). Libertad de enseñaza, loosely translated as academic freedom, was constitutionally guaranteed but with certain limits for private schools. The concern for education is also revealed by the budget for education--12.3 percent of the national budget in 1887-88, a level of spending not to be equalled until the 1950's (Mudarra, 1962, pp. 64, 82).

According to Silva Michelena in Silvert and Reissman (1976, pp. 146-7), Venezuela at the turn of the century could be described as a typically underdeveloped nation. It had essentially a one-crop economy, cacao, with 85 percent of the work force involved in agriculture. The per capita rate of economic growth was almost stationary (.3 percent) as it had been since the beginning of the republic's life and as it continued to be during the first quarter of the twentieth century. Education remained a privilege of the elite. The culture or the nation was strictly controlled by the central government or by caciques who aspired to power.

The majority of people in Venezuela in the first decades of the twentieth century did not have many routes to upward mobility. The economic route was closed because of lack of growth. Educational opportunities were almost nonexistant for the masses because of the traditional reasons: poverty, geography (rural instead of urban), political considerations, race, and so on. Since the political parties, like the government, never penetrated to the masses, the only remaining road to upward mobility was through participation in armed bands or political revolts. This was the situation in Venezuela when the Minister of War, General Juan Vicente Gómez, gained control of the country in 1908.

Gómez ruled Venezuela from 1908 until his death in December, 1935. Daniel Levine (1973, pp. 14-5) analyzed the Gómez administration and noted several characteristics. Even though the regime was a bloody dictatorship, it unwittingly laid the foundation for subsequent expansion and liberalization of political life.

What Gómez did was to unify the nation administratively and politically, effectively eliminating all traces of the nineteenth century heritage of regional conflict and civil war. With the help of petroleum revenues beginning in the 1920's, Gómez's regime was reinforced, allowing him to create a national bureaucracy and army. The professionalization of the army and its role as a reliable arm of his administration in implanting the supremacy of the central government and later as an independent focus of policital power, was a significant accomplishment. It was done with the aid of Chilean advisors whose model was the efficient Prussian Army.

These achievements of Gómez set up the machinery for further change, especially political, but not in the basic governmental structure. He brutally suppressed any serious opposition and was successful as long as

he lived. Thus Gómez created the first effective state machine in Venezuelan history.

As mentioned previously, the export economy of Venezuela shifted from cacao and hides to oil during the Gómez dictatorship. Governmental expenditures increased over five-fold in stable bolivares. An initially slow drift of population from the farms to the cities became a flood after 1936 and foreigners began to come to the country in increasing numbers. The weakening of the small stable aristocracy as the sources of power began to multiply would manifest itself after Gómez's death. The church also re-emerged, favored by the strong religiousity of the Andean caciques who surrounded their caudillo in Caracas.

Some of the issues raised by these changes surfaced in the spate of educational legislation that came during the Gómez period. For the first time, there were some political stirrings of students in the universities.

Between 1893 and 1935, more than a dozen statements and restatements of the legal rules regulating education were promulgated (Mudarra, 1962, pp. 73-139). These regulations concerned the extension of access to schooling, the physical size of the total plant, the form to be taken by primary education, the classical question of libertad de enseñanza, (which was to become more acute as the church regained power while the public schools languished), and the issue of the proper relationship between education for males and females.

The biggest controversy of the time was the relationship between church schools and the state. Until 1914, legislation had been enacted that was slowly increasing state inspection and supervision over Catholic schools. That year, the increasing clericalism of the Gómez regime was institutionalized as complete and unrestricted freedom for private schools

became law. The legislation stated that any citizen could establish schools for the teaching of any subject without prior permission from the state, without the need to adjust to regulations, programs, methods, or textbooks prescribed by public officials (Silvert & Reissman, 1976, pp. 151-152).

Even with the freeing of church education from control by the state in 1914, public educational opportunity increased, although in some sectors, very slowly. Between 1910 and 1920, the annual average spent on education at all levels as a part of the total national budget was 5.2 percent as compared to 4.9 percent in the first decade of the century. There were 17 public secondary schools in 1927, an increase of one over 1920. The total enrollment of all secondary schools in that same year was 1,182 students of whom only 43 were female (Ministerio de Educación, 1949, p. 216). Approximately 710 students were registered in the Central University during the 1927-28 academic year (Ministerio de Educación, 1929, p. 458). The federal primary schools listed 76,639 students at the end of 1928 with the estimation that only two-thirds of the students regularly attended classes. An additional 9,996 students were enrolled in municipal schools, another 9,958 in state schools, with similar estimates of attendance as in the federal schools. Private primary schools had 14,827 registered students, with four-fifths estimated in regular attendance (Ministerio de Educación, 1929, pp. 628-29). Approximately 113,000 students were formally attending school at all levels in a country whose population was estimated to have been 3,026,878 in 1926 (Silvert & Reissman, 1976, p. 152).

As can be seen from these figures, the bottleneck in the educational flow was the secondary system. The relationship between these systems was on the order of 1.2 secondary-school students for every 100 in primary

schools. The figures for the relationship between the university and the secondary system were much better--69 university students for every 100 secondary students.

It was during these last few years of the Gómez regime that latent conditions for change were created. Attempts to foment change had been dampened by political terrorism, the dilution of middle and upper groups by international actors accompanying the new oil discoveries and related interests, (managers, bankers, entrepreneurs, etc.), the persistence of tensions between secular and religious institutions and their representatives, and by the continuing effects of regionalism.

Another factor inhibiting change according to Silvert and Reissman (1976, p. 153) was the inaccessibility and short duration of education for the mass of people in Venezuela. This factor prevented them from experiencing the shared and diversified social life that would have created at least a predisposition toward a less alienating civic life. Regional strife would have been mitigated with a semblance of a national mentality. Given the political character of the Gómez dictatorship and the provincial nature of social life, university students and their few allies were the only organized source for political change. Silvert (Johnson, 1964, pp. 206-66), speculates that university students reached the peak of their political potential precisely in such situations as were found in Venezuela in the mid-1930's, because of the unavailability of alternative ways of being politically effective. Student groups were the only effective and continuous sources of dissidence during the Gómez period. From them, sprang the full array of political institutions and leaders that dominate contemporary Venezuelan "national" history.

Rómulo Betancourt, a former student leader at the Central University of Venezuela, had returned to Venezuela from exile in 1935 and was cooperating

with all opposition groups against Gómez, especially the student groups. Rafael Caldera was also active at this time as a director of the National Student Union. Their concern for an educated public in a functioning democracy will become apparent when these two leaders emerge as presidents of Venezuela in the 1960's and 1970's respectively. No doubt their experiences at this time helped them to formulate their ideas on the importance of public education generally and higher education specifically in the development of a viable democracy (Garrido-Mezquita y Compañia, 1953, p. 210). Silva Michelena (Silvert & Reissman, 1976, pp. 133-4), and Levine (1973, pp. 28-9) as well as other writers on Venezuelan political history agree that whatever there is today of the "national" about Venezuela was gestated in the higher reaches of Venezuela's educational system. According to these writers, the majority of the children of the petite bourgeoisie attended public schools. From this group at the Central University of Venezuela, especially those including Betancourt who studied with the future president of the republic, Rómulo Gallegos, emerged the leaders who, as members of the Student Federation, repeated the 1912 student demonstration in 1928 but with more significant consequences.

With these student movements and demonstrations as a catalyst, the discontent that characterized other sectors of society began to surface. As the students became more aware of the interests of these other groups, they recognized the need to expand their organizations to include them since other means of expressing discontent in organizations or the press had been strictly controlled.

Student movements were the first political manifestation of changes that were taking place in the sources of political power. These changes were the results of the alterations explained earlier in Venezuela's

social and economic structure. It would not be until after the death of Gómez that these transformations would bear fruit.

Gómez dies in 1935 and was succeeded by his Minister of War, General López Contneras, who was succeeded in 1940 by his own Minister of War, General Medina Angarita. Medina was ousted in 1945 by a military coup which brought a definitive end to the Gomecismo era. The events that led to the overthrow of Medina and what happened later merit explanation because of similar movements and outcomes elsewhere.

In the last few years of the Gómez regime, most of the important civilian leaders and their aides had fled Venezuela. Harsh dictatorships flourished in Latin America and the world scene provided no comfort as the phenomenon of fascism spread. Even the church seemed irrevocably on the side of corporatist regimes. At the same time, other models of behavior abounded. The Spanish Civil War was underway with volunteers from all over the world fighting the fascists. President Cárdenas in Mexico was apparently popularizing the revolution in that country. The United States had its New Deal and programs but promised structural change with constitutional norms permitting an effective extension of democracy. Persons from the center and the left had nationalist and democratic heroes and models to follow. And there was a defined enemy--fascism in its several guises--culminating in World War II, a clear confrontation between democracy and totalitarianism.

Opportunities to free Venezuela from the legacy of Gómez came in 1940 with the beginning of the Medina administration. Leaders of the opposition to Gómez began to trickle back as Medina began liberalizing his administration. The Communists returned with their Popular Front and the first truly national political party in Venezuela (Acción Democráctica-AD) was granted legal status in 1941. It was led by the

student dissidents of the 1920's and 1930's, with Betancourt in the forefront, and filled a need that could be denied only at the cost of greater repression than President Medina was willing to muster (Herring, 1966, pp. 519-20). The party became the focal point of anti-Gómez Venezuela and was organized on a yearly and full-time basis with its concommitant parts--student wings, labor sections, women's fronts, etc. (Levine, 1973, pp. 28-9).

In 1945, a small group of army officers planned a coup against Medina and sought popular support from AD because of the small numbers of the military. The leadership of the party accepted and the successful coup introduced a three-year period of AD rule called the trienio. Rómulo Betancourt was named provisional president in charge of a seven-man junta. In the congressional elections of 1946, AD polled three times as many votes as all other parties. In December 1947, Betancourt helped to bring about the peaceful election of AD's candidate Rómulo Gallegos, famous novelist, university professor, and popular hero who won by a four to one margin in the first popular and honest election in the history of Venezuela.

The change in Venezuela at this time mirrored similar progressive regimes established in Latin America after the war in Guatemala, Cuba, Peru, Colombia, Brazil, and elsewhere. But a subsequent return to military or other forms of authoritarian rule also occurred in almost every case: in Guatemala, in 1954; in Cuba, in 1952; in Peru, Colombia, and Venezuela, in 1947 (Herring, 1968, pp. 320-1).

Many reasons are given for the counter coup of 1948. It seems apparent after examining AD's activities and accomplishments during the trienio that it tried too much too soon, especially in a country that was inexperienced in democracy. Opposition parties were allowed to

organize including COPEI in 1946, coalescing anti-AD sentiment, and the Marxists became united in a single communist party. Unions were legally organized for the first time. Elections for congress and the presidency were held in 1947; a constituent assembly did its work; municipal elections were held; and so on through a long chain of activities normal to routinized democratic systems, all new and untried in parochial Venezuela. Additionally, there was AD's egalitarianism implying better treatment of Venezuela's less privileged (colored/pardo) population which renewed the touchy race-class situation extant since colonial days.

Gallegos angered the generals by ordering an end to their plundering of the treasury, alarmed business leaders with recommendations to increase the government's royalties, and frightened landowners with mild proposals for land reform. Because he alienated those powerful sectors of society, Gallegos was ousted by an army coup d'état and a three-man junta was installed in late 1947 as Betancourt and Gallegos were exiled (Herring, 1966, pp. 520-4; Silvert & Reissman, 1976, p. 156).

Michelena (Silvert & Reissman, 1976, pp. 156-7) observes that in the minds of the masses, the government of Gallegos became the new great paterfamilias, not a modern secular state. The lack of political efficacy among the political groups that supported AD seems to be confirmed by the few protests elicited when it was overthrown. The protests there were forthcoming reflected a loyalty to the party rather than loyalty to the democratic system that the party had tried to establish. Similarly members of Venezuela's elite had no loyalties toward the democratic system.

The real problem then was not with the leadership of AD, but that the country could not provide "followership." Silvert and Reissman (1976, p. 157) surmise that national appeals cannot be understood by provincial

people. Nations need citizens and Venezuela's institutions, especially the educational system, had prepared few. Between 1937 and 1945, gains were realized within the educational system, but were marginal once the overall need was considered.

By 1945, over 30 percent of the eligible children were attending primary school as compared to 15.5 of the eligible children in 1935. In the secondary schools, progress was much less. In 1935, .4 percent of the relevant age groups attended; in 1945, the figure increased to 2.9 percent.

Nevertheless, the attention to teacher-training increased as seen by the expansion of normal schools to 31 in 1945 (11 public and 20 private--many being Catholic) from three in 1935. Normal school student enrollment rose from a meager 141 in 1935 to 2,781 a decade later.

University enrollment rose slowly but doubled in the ten-year period 1935-1945 (Ministerio de Educación, 1947, pp. 88-90, 203-4, 209-217). In seeking to professionalise teacher education Venezuela again turned to Chile, as it had to upgrade its army. The Pedagogical Institute of the University of Chile was asked for assistance in establishing a similar university level school for training Venezuelan secondary school teachers. As a result, the Instituto Pedagogico de Caracas was founded in 1936. By 1944, about a fifth of the 273 new secondary teachers in Venezuela were graduates of the Pedagogical Institute (Silvert & Reissman, 1976, p. 157).

Even with added attention to education and its expansion, the system remained class-bound with secondary and university education available to the small fraction of the population who had the financial backing to remain outside the job market.

During the trienio, from 1945 to 1948, primary school enrollment rose by almost 45 percent and secondary enrollment by more than 92 percent. Although the ratio of students in private and public institutions at the primary level favored private schools by an increase from 10 to 15 percent between 1945 to 1948, the enrollment at the public secondary level went from 55 to 76 percent. The fraction of eligible children attending primary school rose from 30 percent in 1945 to 36 percent three years later; in the secondary schools, the fraction rose from 2.9 percent to 4.6 percent. Clearly, the new administration was attempting to make education more "democratic" by opening it up to the less privileged enabling them to move into the upper reaches of the system. Similar rationale will be used in the 1970's to develop the short-cycle postsecondary system, especially the colegios universitarios. University enrollment also rose, though slightly.

In 1946, the University of Zulia was re-opened in Maracaibo to put university education in areas of the country where it was needed (Ministerio de Educación, 1947, p. 204).

The other two universities--Central University in Caracas, and the University of the Andes--had 3,548 and 904 students respectively. There were no private universities.

Besides the improvement in enrollment, two important policy changes were made. One was contained in a decree issued in 1946 that granted autonomy to the universities. This increased legal status to them broadening their potential base of financing and allowed them to establish independently of state authority their own academic criteria in matters of curriculum, hiring and firing personnel, and student selection.

The university grounds were to be independent of police interference and were under the direct control of the academic authorities.

The limitations were that the rector and department heads (secretarios) were selected by the President of the Republic and subject to dismissal at his discretion (Ministerio de Educación, 1947, p. 204).

The only other policy change was in the 1948 Law of Education which concerned church-state relations. It declared that education was an essential function of the state and prohibited the teaching of "partisan propaganda" or of doctrines contrary to democratic principles or those which favored the development of religious, ethnic, or social antagonisms (Silvert and Reissman, 1976, p. 159). In order to make this law effective, the government controlled the awarding of diplomas by private schools, as well as public schools.

When the AD regime collapsed in 1948, the three-man junta which took its place proclaimed its dedication to democracy and said its purpose was to rescue the nation from the communistic AD.

The junta imposed strict censorship on the press, jailed opponents without trial, imprisoned labor leaders, and used tear gas against student demonstrators at the Central University of Caracas.

The United States supported the junta since it promised to honor international obligations and hold free elections. In 1952, after sporadic revolts, the assassination of the leader of the coup, and growth of underground opposition groups, the junta decided to hold the "free" elections. They felt the elections were no risk since they had created a governmental party and had outlawed all opposition parties except the innocuous URD (Democratic Republican Union) and COPEI.

As the elections drew near, the outlawed AD sent word that voters in the rural areas should vote COPEI and voters in the cities should cast their ballots for URD. The first returns showed the oppostition leading the junta two to one. The dominant member of the junta, Marcos

Pérez Jiménez, didn't like his impending defeat so he dumped his associates, censored the returns, and announced his overwhelming victory.

In 1953, he implemented changes in the constitution which gave him unlimited powers and appointed him President for five years (Herring, 1966, pp. 521-2).

Pérez Jiménez mitigated the educational advances of the trienio during the period he was in power (1953-1958). Some growth was realized in both enrollment and the budget, but in smaller increments. Budget increases for education went from 119 million bolivares in 1948-49 to 178.3 millions in 1957-58 which represented 7.6 percent of the national budget compared with 12 percent spent on education during the trienio.

Enrollment in the primary schools increased from 442,112 to 751,561 and in the secondary schools rose from 22,299 to 55,194 during the decade of 1948-58 (Ministerio de Educación, 1966, II, pp. 7, 99). This increase hid a loss in the percentage of students attending public schools. Between 1948-58, the public primary school proportion of enrollment dropped from 85 to 81 percent. Secondary enrollment declined from 76 to 55 percent. Monroy (Note 3) states that during this decade, illiteracy rose from 33 percent in 1950 to 57 percent in 1958 and that only 32 percent of the school population (7 to 24 years old) actually attended school.

This trend reflects the Jiménez government's general lack of concern for the poor. His main concern was rapid private economic growth which would take care of poverty through market mechanisms. As the rich got more wealth they would invest in more factories and create more jobs. Those with jobs would spend money and buy products creating more demand and new jobs to produce more goods. The poor would eventually benefit as wealth trickled down to them via new employment opportunities.

Further evidence of the government's preference toward education for the haves rather than the have-nots was the reopening of Venezuela's private universities, for the first time in modern history reducing the impetus towards public education started during the trienio. Andres Bellos Catholic University, Jesuit sponsored, and the Santa Maria University, sponsored by private secular groups, were both established in 1954-55. By 1957-58 their 2,082 students accounted for about a fifth of the total of 10,270 university students for that year (Ministerio de Educación, 1966, p. 489).

University autonomy suffered with the imposition of tuition and fee charges breaking with the traditional concept of the free university (no tuition or fee charges), dating back to the time of Gúzman Blanco. Fees were imposed in 1952 after the Central University had been closed in 1951 and reopened in 1952. Betancourt (1956, pp. 606-697) stated that the dictatorship hoped to impede access to professional training of the lower classes thereby eliminating the most revolutionary sectors in the university. The restriction of university enrollment would be accomplished by these charges which consisted of charged for registration, tuition for each professional school (including additional fees for labs if requires), and a payment of Bs.24 for each test. The dictatorship according to Betancourt (1956, pp. 606-697) hoped by this action to eliminate from the future professional elite the reformist impulse by insisting that "order," in whatever form, best assured the peaceful acquisition of material wealth rather than trusting democratic systems of government, which guarantee the free play of social forces (Silvert & Reissman, 1976, p. 161).

In 1957, Pérez Jiménez held a plebiscite instead of the promised elections. He was elected to a new term, but it appeared that the dictatorship had angered all sections of Venezuelan society (Herring, 1968, p. 523).

By the end of the Pérez Jiménez regime, according to Silva Michelena (Silvert & Reissman, 1976, p. 162), there was the usual heritage of piratical development practices.

There were extreme inequalities of income distribution, under- and unemployment, proscribed political parties, weakened local governments, a bloated public bureaucracy, censorship of the press, inflation, an angry church, angry students, and even more ominous, angry junior officers in the army who resented the privileges of the generals.

On January 1, 1958, the navy and air force took direct action in unseating the dictator. The first blows were struck when bombs dropped on Caracas. After three weeks of rioting, a coalition of opposition parties including the Communists, called a general strike.

On January 23, Pérez Jiménez fled to Miami with 200 million dollars stolen from the treasury (Silvert & Reissman, 1976, p. 161; Herring, 1966, p. 522-3).

1958 to the Present

The events that followed the fall of Pérez Jiménez can be better understood by examining the general hemispheric conditions. Democratic euphoria was rampant throughout Latin America in the late 1950's as military dictatorships fell one after another. Argentina's Peron was overthrown in the mid-1950's, and in 1958, the first legally elected civilian since 1927 took office. Brazil was in a process of civilian-led development in which national parties were for the first time beginning to supplant the regional structures. In 1959, Batista fled Cuba supplanted by Castro with the initial approval of the Caribbean's Social Democrats. Colombia's dictator, Rojas Pinilla, was overthrown in 1958 when a coalition of Liberals and Conservatives promised elections. Peru

and Bolivia seemed to be attempting reformist governments. In the early 1960's, Trujillo, dictator of the Dominican Republic, was assassinated (Silvert & Reissman, 1976, p. 162).

At the same time, according to Silva Michelena (Silvert & Reissman, 1976, p. 165), socialism began to separate from Russian sovietism. The distinction between economic collectivism and democratic socialism was beginning to be widely understood, so that Marxist movements in Latin America, although highly fragmented, began to move in national and culturally specific terms (Herring, 1966).

In addition, Kennedy's Alliance for Progress contributed to the sense of democratic derring-do. The United States seemed committed to national planning and development in Latin America, pledging non-intervention in all matters except those immediately affecting the Cold War. The United States backed up its promises with the creation of the Inter-American Development Bank as well as the Alliance for Progress.

The ideas for developing Latin American fit comfortably with reformist leaders as well as giving center-left governments including Betancourt's in Venezuela after 1958 a sense of affinity with the U.S. they had not felt before. The new development was oriented toward social rather than economic improvements and education figures prominently in it as in Venezuela after the fall of Pérez Jiménez.

The early euphoria soon gave way to some of the harsher realities of U.S. politics related to foreign policy. The Bay of Pigs, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the sending of American troops to the Dominican Republic, Project Camelot, and the economic effects of the Vietnam War combined to kill the new-found reformist spirit in national development in Latin America.

By the early 1970's, Venezuela had the only viable democracy in South America. By 1973, Uruguay had lost the last vestiges of substantial democracy; Brazil had endured a decade of military dictatorship in alliance with international sources of capital; Chile had become a corporate state under military authoritarianism; Bolivia was a right-wing military dictatorship; Colombia was losing in its attempt to make democracy work within rigid class-related politics; and Ecuador was unable to develop sufficient institutional maturity to handle its problems with continuity and effectiveness (Silvert & Reissman, 1976, pp. 163-4).

The conditions just mentioned were what Venezuela faced as the Jiménez regime was overthrown. With the dictator's ouster, the army took control and named a five-man junta from its ranks. Because of protests from the allied AD, URD, and COPEI, two civilians were added to the junta and the cabinet was to consist of civilians.

The junta under the leadership of Admiral Wolfgang Lanazábal instituted varied and swift changes. The press was no longer censored; political prisoners were freed; exiles were invited to return; universities were reopened; and the property of Pérez Jiménez and his cronies was seized,which did little to pay off the country's 500 million dollar debt. To ease the financial crisis, the 50-50 split of profits between the government and the oil companies ceased; the government would now receive 60 percent and the oil companies 40 percent (Herring, 1966, p. 523).

Free elections were scheduled and held in December, 1958, with each major party supporting its candidate: AD named Rómulo Betancourt; URD, Admiral Lanazábal; COPEI, Rafael Caldera. Betancourt won with over a million votes, just short of a plurality (Wiarda & Klein, 1979, p. 225).

The next few years were ones of consolidation for democratic forces and proved to be difficult. Betancourt was pressured by Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, by Castro, and by leftist groups within Venezuela. The animosity between Betancourt and Trujillo dated from the 1940's when he and Jose Figueres of Costa Rica criticized right-wing despotism in Latin America. Trujillo tried to link Betancourt and Figueres with communism, but failed. In June 1960, Trujillo sent assassins to murder Betancourt by bombing his car. His military aid was killed and his Minister of Defense was wounded. Betancourt suffered only a severely burned arm (Herring, 1966, p. 528).

During the same period, Betancourt's initial support for Castro dissipated as Castro insisted on exporting revolution. At the same time, some leftists--including students--left AD and formed MIR (Leftist Revolutionary Movement), which, with the Venezuelan Communist Party, supported FLAN (Armed Forces for National Liberation) and began terrorist activities to overthrow the democratic regime of Betancourt.

In 1961, Betancourt supported the OAS's suspension of Cuba and broke off diplomatic relations with Havana. The Venezuela Communist Party and MIR were banned and some leftist members of Congress were arrested. These unpopular moves were seen by some as an attempt by Betancourt to placate and control the military.

Violence continued under the leadership of FLAN and in November 1963, a cache of Cuban arms bound for FLAN was discovered by government forces. The OAS supported the Venezuelan government's charge against Cuba and voted sanctions against that country. Havana Radio praised FLAN and attacked Betancourt, no doubt because Castro had chosen Venezuela as one of his prime revolutionary targets. Leftists in Venezuela kept up the pressure by sabotage, and ordering voters to abstain in the December 1963, elections.

The tactics of the left failed and more than 90 percent of the eligible voters went to the polls and elected another AD president, Raúl Leoni with 33 percent of the vote. His election dealt a blow to terrorists; although they still exist, their influence and importance have diminished considerably (Shafer, 1978, pp. 754-55).

In 1967, even the Venezuelan Communist Party withdrew its support from these activities. A Communist Deputy from Congress commented on this change and stated that Venezuela was now a representative democracy and the revolutionary vanguard had been isolated, therefore the party must change tactics in order to throw off the capitalist yoke (Levine, 1973, pp. 53-54). Betancourt (1978, p. 269) also points out that the most votes ever won by the Venezuelan Communist Party was in the 1947 general elections with a dismal 3 percent of the electorate. More recently, in 1978, MIR/MAS (Movement Towards Socialism), many of whom had split from AD, had been able to muster only 4.21 percent of the votes in the Presidential elections (Wiarda & Klein, 1979, p. 227). Subsequently, either the organized left in Venezuela has been effectively absorbed into the two major parties, or disaffected groups from the mainstream continue to operate ineffectively on the periphery of organized political activity.

Besides the preservation of democracy from myriad pressures, Betancourt developed the country's first four-year plan. He also worked on improving agricultural programs, including land redistribution and industrial production and, as will be seen, improved educational opportunity. By the time Leoni took office in 1964, the GNP registered a yearly increase of 4.5 percent, most of the Pérez Jiménez regime's debts had been liquidated, and the economy continued its growth without inflation. Leoni abandoned the alliance between AD and COPEI and continued to have

some problems with demonstrations by the communists, noisy Castroites, and FLAN.

Leoni was able to consolidate and implement much that had remained in the planning stage under Betancourt. He continued to stress social welfare, industrialization, agrarian reform, education, transportation, and a variety of other social and development programs. There was one attempt at a coup d'etat in October 1966, which was ended swiftly with the court-martial of a few highly placed officials. In partial response to pressures from the army and the continued guerrilla and terrorist activity of the left, Leoni seized the Central University of Caracas on December 14, 1966, a perceived haven for leftists, and the campus was occupied by police and soliders. Leoni suspended total autonomy for the universities but new legislation concerning them was not forthcoming until the next administration (Burroughs, 1974, p. 107).

Despite his problems Leoni and his government carried off the scheduled elections peacefully in 1968. Because of a split among leaders in AD, COPEI's standard-bearer and founder, Rafael Caldera, won with 29 percent of the vote (Shafer, 1978, p. 755). He did not have a strong majority party supporting him but campaigned on the slogan "time for a change," and promptly set about to make good his promises after his inauguration. He offered amnesty to all guerrilla fighters in the hills and was willing to legalize the Communist Party in order to give these dissidents a lawful platform. He emptied the jails of political prisoners and dropped the Betancourt Doctrine of not dealing with undemocratic regimes as the government's major feature of its foreign policy. It was also during Caldera's administration that Venezuela helped to found OPEC. Part of the reason for Venezuela's actions were decisions made by Washington during the 1950's to the 1970's, when imported Mexican and

Canadian oil was not put under mandatory control as was Venezuela's. Even in 1970, Caldera visited Nixon in order to plead with him for hemispheric preferential treatment of Venezuelan oil but was not successful. Nevertheless, Venezuela did not participate in the Arab boycott in 1973 and even increased oil production and oil exports to the United States.

As a result of the rise in petroleum prices, revenues from the product increased from $2.4 billion in 1969, to $4.7 billion in 1973, to $11.5 billion in 1974 (Shafer, 1978, p. 757). Caldera continued with most of his predecessor's programs, including agrarian reform, social and welfare services, expansion and diversification of industry, expanding educational opportunity, especially at the postsecondary level and implementing several educational innovations that will be discussed later (Wiarda & Klein, 1979, p. 227).

Disaster struck Caldera's party with the overthrow of the socialist Allende in Chile. Some Venezuelans surmised that Eduardo Frei's tenure before Allende, Frei was a Christian Democrat as is Caldera, had opened the door to the "Communist" Allende with the inevitable consequence of the armed forces taking over the government. This fear was cleverly exploited by Acción Democratica as new elections approached and this time AD was united. As a result, AD's candidate, Andrés Pérez, won with 48.77 percent of the votes (Wiarda & Klein, 1979, p. 227). Another peaceful change of government took place apparently reinforcing that country's dedication to the democratic representative of political processes.

Pérez moved quickly to nationalize two major industries, the iron mines and the oil fields in January of 1975 and 1976 respectively. In an interesting twist to nationalization, the government split up the

21 foreign oil companies into three national ones: Lagoven, Petroven, and Carpoven. They compete with one another for business. The total compensation paid the foreign companies was $1.28 billion. This move followed political pressures at home and a lack of better treatment by the United States concerning the importation of Venezuelan oil. With the continued rise in the price of petroleum products, and therefore Venezuela's revenues, Pérez embarked on a new four-year plan (1976-80) which called for the expenditure of $52 billion. Much of this money was to be used to diversity industry, increase farm production, beginning work on the construction of a $1.5 billion subway system for Caracas, and continued funding of the almost completed $4 billion project at Ciudad Guayana (Crow, 1980, p. 779).

Even with this increased government spending economic distortions still existed on several fronts. Although the country has the highest per capita income in Latin America many of the staples of daily living are imported. Although agricultural production grew by 2.7 percent from 1969 to 1973 and 4.6 percent from 1974 to 1978, the country remains a net importer of foodstuffs (Morganti, 1981, p. 111). For the first time, inflation became a problem between 1975-1980 rainging from 10 to 20 percent (Morganti, 1981, p. 4). Crow (1980, p. 779) also stated the distribution of income is severely distorted with the concomitant problems that it suggests, including continuing disparity between rural and urban areas.

The most important issue that emerged in the December 1978 elections was the problem of inflation and the role of government in the economy. At the time of the election the government expenditures accounted for 41 percent of the GNP as compared to 14 percent in 1970. Both major party candidates hired United States political campaign specialists

and the three major candidates spent a total of $100 million during the election (Crow, 1980, p. 780). The winner of this very close election was Luis Herrera Campíns of COPEI.

By the end of 1980 and the beginning of 1981, Campíns faced severe problems. The country was suffering from a 12 to 20 percent inflation. This continued despite government attempts to control the prices of certain basic commodities and declining rate of government spending as a portion of the GNP. Even with this effort the government has been increasing its budget 50 percent every two years and one ministry, for example, the Ministry of State Planning, now has a budget larger than the national budget ten years earlier. In addition, the nation remains a net importer of goods, still has a national debt of approximately $7 billion [as compared to Mexico's $8 billion debt (Zanker, 1982, p. 51)], but retained a positive balance of payments in 1980 with international reserves of $6 billion. Oil continues to dominate the country's revenues by providing 66 percent of the government's income in 1979 although there have been serious attempts to reduce dependence on exports. The production of aluminium and aluminum ore is now the second most important product in their export trade.

Exploration of the Orinoco oil fields promises to contain one of the largest hydrocarbon deposits in the world; tentative estimates are that about 700,000 million barrels of crude are there. Since this is heavy crude, foreign technology will probably be needed as well as the kinds of technicians provided by the CU. Otherwise, Venezuela's existing oil wells are predicted to produce only another 20 years and their natural gas wells another 42 years. Population growth continues at about a 3.2 percent rate and undocumented persons, especially Colombians, make up between one to two million of the country's total population.

Close to a majority of Venezuelans are under the age of 25 and are constantly pressuring the economic structure of the country seeking employment and job security (Morganti, 1981; Crow, 1980, p. 777).

The latest political development was that both Caldera and Betancourt intimated in March 1981, they were willing to run for president in 1984. The death of Betancourt in September 1981, will no doubt cloud the future political moves by AD.

In attempting to solve these problems, the Sixth National Plan (1981-85) calls for limited growth. Emphasis is to be placed on small and medium sized projects designed to lessen dependence on imports, foreign technology, and oil. According to the Minister of Information and Toruism, Enrique Olivares, education will be an integral part of the Sixth Plan as it has been in the past ("Dos años de gobierno...," 1981, p. 15). General support for education will be maintained and efforts for improvement in the quality of education is in the plan.

Support for education generally and higher education specifically has been a characteristic of all democratic governments of Venezuela. The notion that education is "good" for the nation, especially one that purports to be democratic, is reflected early after Pérez Jiménez in the language of the first Four Year Plan for 1960-64. That document states that the school system is the principal vehicle for inculcating younger generations in the general principles that the society has outlined as its norms. Venezuela must educate to develop and sustain the democratic order, it states, and all of the complex ideals and skills involved. In addition schools should be established emphasizing industrial/technical learning, and adults made literate. Access should be facilitated to middle-level schooling and more universities created (CORDIPLAN, 1960, p. 1).

Expansion of the system was phenomenal. There was a 97 percent jump of primary school enrollment between 1958 and 1966, 244 percent increase in the secondary schools, 380 percent in vocational education, and a 328 percent growth rate at the university level, an average annual growth rate of 41 percent. Unlike the previous dictatorship, most of this growth took place in the public sector indicating expanded opportunity for the lower strata of society. Although teacher training expanded 55 percent during this period (1958-66), 56 percent of all students attended private normal schools. However, the Pedagogical Institute of Caracas grew enormously. It increased 723 percent in enrollment from 1957-66 with 2,848 students (Silvert & Reissman, 1976, pp. 167-68). By 1968, 61 percent of the relevant age group was in primary school and 34 percent in secondary schools [as compared to 44 and 11 percent respectively in 1955] (UNESCO, 1969, p. 81).

The ratio of primary to traditional secondary students was eight to one. But as measured against students in all kinds of secondary education including vocational and technical education, was five to one. In the relationship between secondary students and university students it was four to one. The educational flow was beginning to become more balanced through the pipeline and diversity was becoming more acceptable. One example was that during this period 39 percent of all secondary level students were in vocational and normal school training programs instead of the traditional college training programs. Still, on the average nationally, 15 percent of primary age students did not attend regularly up to 25 percent in some rural areas. About 15 percent of all primary school students were repeating grades as were almost 10 percent of secondary school students. In 1966, a third of entering primary school students completed the required six year program (or cycle). A third

of entering secondary students managed to complete the required six years at that level. Over all, the chance that a first year primary school student would graduate from any kind of secondary school was one in nine (Ministerio de Educación, 1966 I and II, pp. ix; xv-xvi; xxxii-xxxxii; 58-59).

The general growth of education in the 1960's continued in the decade of the seventies. There was special emphasis on postsecondary education and its delivery systems. Between 1969 and 1979, total enrollment for pre-school through the university went from 2,245,273 to 4,173,380. This meant that 55.27 percent of the population between the ages of four to 25 attended some sort of educational institution (Ministerio de Educación, 1979, p. 338; Note 2). This increase was not only quantitative but qualitative. That is more students at all levels were graduating from their respective levels to the next highest level by passing their yearly examinations. Ruscoe (1977, p. 272) states that focusing on yearly examination pass notes in Venezuela as a principal indicator of the quality of primary and secondary schooling may be justified in terms of the centrality of examinations to other problems of quality. Failure to pass a yearly examination is the prima facie reason for having to repeat a grade. And repetition of a grade may be expected to lead to the premature dropping out of school. Examination pass notes are manifested by the numbers of students reaching each successive grade level.

In 1969, for example, 167,402 primary students reached the sixth grade, the final level for elementary students. In 1979, this number rose to 261,894 students, a 156 percent increase. This increase compares to a 141 percent increase in overall enrollment in elementary education from 1,689,608 in 1969 to 2,378,601 in 1979.

The increased success in secondary education by passing yearly examinations was even more dramatic. In 1969, 964 students reached the third year of the diversified cycle which was the final year of secondary education. In 1979, 14,212 students reached the same level, a 1,474 percent increase. This gain compares favorably to an overall growth of daytime secondary education enrollment from 360,435 students to 787,032 or a 219 percent increase. The wastage rate within the whole system was still enitrely too high. Nevertheless, more students were passing through the system and putting continued pressure on all levels of postsecondary education (Ministerio de Educacion, 1979, pp. 362, 416).

Financially, support for education by all levels of government has been sustained and at an increasing rate. In 1969, total appropriations including central, municipal, and state governments as well as other ministries other than education totaled Bs1,954,138,000 or $455,510,000 (@ Bs4.29 = $1.00). In 1979, total appropriations for education were Bs10,305,123,000 or $2,402,127, an increase of 527 percent since 1969. This was approximately 20 percent of the national budget of Bs50,958,100,000 in 1979 as compared to 19 percent of the 1969 budget of Bs10,286,000,000 (CNU/OPSU, 1980, p. 73).

Increased pressure from secondary school graduates forced higher education to expand during the decade 1970-1980. Enrollments went from 70,816 in 1970 to 298,884 in 1980 or a 422 percent growth rate. Appropriations grew 871 percent from Bs526,900,000 or $122,820,510 to Bs4,589,800,000 or $1,069,883,400 (CNU/OPSU, 1980, p. 71). In order to accommodate this expansion and provide better access the government created several types of universities and short-cycle postsecondary institutions. These short-cycle institutions addressed several concerns of the government. Their present scope and structure, problem areas, and future will be analyzed in Chapter 3.

Summary

The review of the literature indicates several trends concerning higher education in Venezuela. Education developed very slowly in Venezuela from colonial times until the very recent past. During the colonial period it was the privilege of the rich, very traditional, and conservative. Higher education was even considered reactionary. After independence, efforts were made to make education more available to the masses but progress was slow, at best, to nonexistent. Higher education remained limited both in curriculum and access. Beginning with the 20th century, the university emerged as a focal point for students protesting the continuing dictatorships.

A brief flirtation with democracy during the trienio (1945-1948), led by former student protesters resulted in the first free election in Venezuela of a former professor of these students to the Presidency. During this time much effort was directed in opening up education to the masses. The experiment with democracy was short lived and in 1948, the democrats were exiled and the generals took over. Education was again stymied. Finally in 1958, Jiménez was overthrown.

The development of a viable democracy has been an important factor for education and its expansion in Venezuela. A strong two party system has emerged and the government has changed hands from one party to the other four times through peaceful democratic elections. The necessity of mass public education in Venezuela's democracy is a policy that has never been seriously challenged by any political party since the overthrow of Jiménez. In addition, the economy has produced tremendous revenues for the government. Because of this, public education generally and public higher education specifically has been and continues to be generously supported by the government with the concomitant expansion.

The effect of this support has been that higher education is the only segment of the educational establishment that has expanded at the same rate as the population growth.

CHAPTER 3
SHORT-CYCLE POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION IN VENEZUELA, THE DEVELOPMENT OF COLEGIOS UNIVERSITARIOS

Venezuelan higher education has expanded rapidly in the past two decades. Demands placed on the system are in part due to the increased numbers of secondary school graduates mentioned in Chapter 2. In addition, the government has insisted that its priorities for higher education be met. These included democratization, diversification, and regionalization of higher education as well as having higher education promote more directly the economic growth of the nation.

In order to comply with these priorities and to accommodate the continuing influx of students, the Ministry of Education established a system of postsecondary short-cycle higher education institutions. These new institutions included technical, polytechnical, and pedagogical institutos and the colegios universitarios (CU). They are not an important part of Venezuela's higher educational system.

In 1980, short-cycle postsecondary higher education institutions included 20.17 percent of all students in institutions of higher education with 60,283 students. In 1980, the universities enrolled 238,601 students. These figures may be compared with 4,598 students in 1970 or 6.49 percent of total enrollment. When colegios universitarios are excluded, the 1973 to 1980 increase was from 1,042 to 13,638 students respectively, a 1300 percent growth rate. The 1980 figures represented 4.56 percent of all students enrolled in higher education.

The funding of these institutions between 1971 and 1980 grew at a rate of 1902 percent from Bs.28,000,000 or $6,526,806 to Bs.532,600,000

or $124,149,180. University appropriations during the same time grew at a rate of 813 percent from Bs.498,900,000 or $116,293,700 to Bs.4,057,200,000 or $945,573,426. The university appropriations represented 88.4 percent of the total postsecondary budget in 1980 as compared to 94.7 percent in 1970 (CNU/OPSU, 1980, p. 73; Note 1).

The remainder of this chapter will study the development of these new short-cycle postsecondary institutions. Foreign influence on this development will also be examined. Special attention will focus on the rationale for development, present status, problem areas, which will seem all too familiar to United States community college administrators, and the future of colegios universitarios.

In order to develop a more accurate idea of events as stated in the documentation, interviews and other data obtained in Venezuela will be utilized. A number of those interviewed were pre-chosen as outlined in Chapter 1 including such knowledgeable observers as: a former Minister of Education, Directors of selected CU, Ministry of Education officials and other qualified respondents. Other knowledgeable observers were interviewed by means of contacts made through the original interviewees. A total of 30 respondents participated in the study.

Foreign Influences

Mata (1979, pp. 24-26) notes that France between 1965 and 1969 instituted several educational reforms including the creation of a number of short-cycle postsecondary institutions (university institutes of technology) committed to training superior (higher) technicians in and for the community and region where they were located. Venezuela imitated these resulting in the creation of the Instituto Universitario de Tecnología de la Región Capital and other similar institutos around

the country. Although these institutions were new for Venezuela they were not unique in Latin America as Mexico had had them for several years. These institutos were the first of the short-cycle postsecondary institutions created in the country and became the prototype for others. The general governance, structure, and access of the instituto universitario is mirrored in the more unique creation of Venezuela, the colegio universitario.

As with the institutos, foreign influence was significant in the creation of the CU. Yelvington (1979) describes how the government of Venezuela sent a team of educators to California to obtain a briefing on the community colleges there and in other states. The concepts gleaned from that trip and additional ones through 1977 have been important in shaping the present structure of CU.

All of the informants who commented on foreign influence in the creation of CU, agreed that it was extensive. A former Minister of Education noted that in 1970 and 1971, the Ministry of Education sent three different groups of educational experts abroad to France, England, and the United States. Their major responsibility was to study the different types of delivery systems for higher education in those countries. The English group looked at the Open University there and long distance delivery systems. The French group analyzed the short-cycle postsecondary technological institutes there. The United States group examined community colleges in California and New York. They were scheduled to go to Florida but were unable to make that visit. In California they visited San Diego, Santa Monica, Cosa Mesa, and Oakland. They also inspected two colleges in New York. One other expert was sent to Mexico to see how they had adapted the French technological institutes to Mexican needs.

When the experts returned, their findings and suggestions along with other factors to be analyzed later, resulted in changes in the structure of higher education by the Ministry. In 1971, three public short-cycle postsecondary institutes of technology were created using the French system as a model. The institute in Caracas is still staffed largely by mostly French nationals. There are now at least 13 such French inspired public institutes in Venezuela.

In 1971, the university colleges (CU) were founded, modeled somewhat after community colleges in the United States. Several features of the community colleges that were incorporated into the CU included: a general education component (cíclo básico) in each student's curriculum, appeal to non-traditional students (i.e., older, part-time), majority of classes at night, non-residential campus, and, as initially planned, the ability of a student to transfer from a CU to a university and complete a degree program. There are now seven public CU in the country. Finally, in 1977, the National Open University was created in Caracas along the lines of the Open University in England.

According to those interviewed then, including all the directors of the CU visited, a former Minister of Education, ministry officials and others, foreign influence in Venezuelan higher education has been substantial. They all confirmed that this was especially true in the creation of CU where the United States community college model was utilized. The former Minister of Education confirmed that the French and English models did not influence the development of CU as did the United States model.

Rationale for Creating Colegios Universitarios

The legislation that initiated colegios universitarios was presidential decree number 792 in 1971 although regulations governing the structure of

the institutions did not come until January 1974, with decree number 1,574 (Gaceta Oficial, 1971, No. 29.669; 1974, No. 30.316). Both of these decrees came from President Rafael Caldera.

In the Ministry of Education's publication Colegios Universitarios Diseño Curricular (Caricote, 1972), the Director of Superior (higher) Education outlines the rationale for the establishment of CU by Caldera. "The Ministry of Education is developing a strategy to give the nation true opportunities of study, at the superior level, and whose basic principles of democratization, diversification and regionalization of learning will overcome the classical scene of traditional programs that have been offered [at the universities] as the only alternative of superior (higher) education," (Caricote, 1972, p. 11). The idea of the democratization of Venezuelan education is a popular theme in the literature of Caldera's time, before, and in the present (CORDIPLAN, 1960; Carabaño, 1970; Ministerio de Educación, 1971; CUFM, 1975; Ministerio de Educación, 1979). One of its meanings then and now has been interpreted to mean the expansion of the system to allow more people to attend institutions of higher education (Caricote, 1972, pp. 7-18; Fernández Heres, 1978, p. 129). Caldera states that expansion of the system was a reason for establishing the CU in a dedication speech for a CU in 1972 at Los Teques (Fernández Heres, 1978, p. 129). The idea of expansion is still a major force for justifying these institutions according to the immediate past Minister of Education and former director of a CU (until June, 1982), Rafael Fernández Heres (Ministerio de Educación, 1979).

The expansion or democratization of postsecondary education follows the increase of graduates from all levels of primary and secondary education. Graduates from the secondary system are automatically eligible

for matriculation in the postsecondary system. Because of the tremendous increase of these students, one of the major problems of the universities has been lack of space to accommodate them. The system of CU has been a response to the demand for more space by the Ministry of Education.

All interviewees supported the notion that the democratization of postsecondary education was one of the rationales for the creation of CU. An assistant to the Director of Middle (secondary) Education stated that the democratization of postsecondary education was part of a coordinated effort that included the secondary system. Beginning in 1970, all graduates of the secondary system were to receive the bachillerato diploma. This type of diploma entitles the recipient to enroll in any postsecondary institution in the country. Before 1980, only those students enrolled in the humanities and sciences curriculum were entitled to matriculate in the university. Those enrolled in the normal school curriculum could go to work or attend pedagogical institutes. All other majors such as industrial, commercial, or agricultural had only the option of going directly to work or attending politechnical institutes and transferring into the university (polytechnical institutes at that time were considered postsecondary but non-university parallel). With the reform in 1970 though, all programs included a general studies (cíclo básico) curriculum for the first three years of the total five years at the secondary level (Carabaño, 1970, p. 19). The general studies format for the first three years addressed concerns expressed by the universities. The universities wanted students to be better prepared in general education. This reform was initiated and supported mainly by officials in the secondary system according to the informant, an assistant to the Director of Middle Education.

Although the researcher found little supporting statistical evidence, it is highly likely that with the tremendous increase of graduates from the secondary system, students entering the postsecondary levels are now sprinkled with non-traditional types especially those from lower social strata/income groups. This impression was confirmed by several high level observers as well as students. Several directors of CU and officials of the Ministry agreed that the CU were attracting non-traditional students especially from the middle to lower-middle income groups. All the students interviewed stated that they were the first in their family to attend an institution of higher education.

According to Ruscoe (1978, p. 255) and Torres (1980, pp. 19-20) the main factor in this democratization or equalization of access comes from education becoming more of a public enterprize instead of a private one, especially at the secondary and postsecondary levels. This change has been accelerating since 1958 with the overthorw of Pérez Jiménez. At the postsecondary level these non-traditional students can be found mainly in the public short-cycle institutions.

When Caldera spoke of diversification as a rationale for CU, he apparently had several interpretations of the word in mind. As more secondary students became eligible for higher education and the economy continued to develop, the government's perception was that the universities' limited access and traditional liberal arts, humanities, and professional school graduates were not meeting the educational demands of the nation. The virtual monopoly over higher education by the universities and their reputation of being a haven for radicals, encouraged Caldera to continue the limiting of university powers begun by the previous Leoni government. Caldera did this with the 1970 University Law restricting university autonomy, campus political participation to regular

students as distinct from repeating students, as well as limiting terms of office for university officials and subjecting the university to stricter auditing by the national government (Arnove, 1977, pp. 205-6).

The development of CU was part of an overall effort by the government to address these concerns. Between 1969 and 1974 a variety of new public postsecondary institutions besides the CU were created. They included: three additional universities, six institutos universitarios de tecnología, two institutos universitarios pedagógicos, three institutos universitarios polytécnicos, and five colegios universitarios. All but one of these institutions were under the direct control of the Ministry of Education with restricted autonomy in the case of the new universities or with none at all in the case of the institutos and colegios universitarios.

These new institutions improved the access of secondary school graduates and in the instance of the institutos or colegios universitarios provided alternatives to the traditional university route. In the CU after completing a core course or a cíclo básico, the student could continue for another two years and graduate as a técnico superior or superior technician. This person then would be prepared to be employed as a technician or as a mid-level manager (CUC, 1981). The other option theoretically was to continue to the university and earn the bachelor's degree, usually in an administrative, educational, or technological discipline. The university by decree that was to accept these CU graduates was the University of Simón Rodríguez in Caracas (CUFM, 1975). Therefore the students had the option of going to work or continuing on for their university degree.

The CU along with the other short-cycle institutions also had the potential of breaking the universities hold over higher education and

splintering what were considered radical and unruly student groups. These groups caused considerable upheaval in the late 1960's in the form of student strikes. The weakening of these groups was to occur hopefully with larger numbers of students being enrolled at the more tightly controlled institutos and CU instead of the autonomous universities.

For Caldera, diversification meant better access, more alternatives for students, and potentially less power wielded by autonomous universities.

There was little agreement among the respondents concerning the importance of the 1970 University Law in creating CU. One observer, a former Minister of Education and the Director of Secondary, Superior, and Special Education in 1970, did state that the practical effect of the 1970 Law was to encourage the Ministry to provide for short-cycle terminal degree programs (carreas cortas). In commenting further on the government's decision to create CU, a director of a pedagogical institution noted that the government by 1970 had lost confidence in the universities. They were worried about their size (especially the Central University of Venezuela), difficulties in administering them, their increasing demands for appropriations, and their powerful student groups. The creation of CU addressed these fears because they were not autonomous, but were smaller, and would aid in fragmenting student power by dispersing them on to compact non-centralized campuses.

The universities had mixed feelings concerning the bringing into being of short-cycle institutions. According to one university official, these new institutions would relieve them of some of the pressures caused by the overcrowding problem by attracting students to the CU. This point of view was supported by the directors of CU interviewed. But, a pedagogical director stated that university officials saw the CU as an unnecessary

additional level between the secondary schools and the university. And, another university official observed that the new short-cycle institutions were also perceived as a threat. For one thing, they were not autonomous but were directly controlled by the Ministry. They were also going to offer short-cycle programs which the universities wanted to control. Additionally, these new institutions were a possible future competitor for students, appropriations, and prestige. Because of these concerns, a former Minister of Education pointed out that the universities had lobbied for the power to administer these institutions along with the new university Simón Rodríguez and the University of the Oriente.

Finally, there was general agreement among those interviewed that the short-cycle system including the CU was more able than the universities to meet the demands of the economy for high level technicians and mid-level managers. Since the universities mainly consist of professional schools, the short-cycle system is alone in offering programs for high level technicians and mid-level managers.

The final principle mentioned by the Ministry publication (Caricote, 1972) for the development of the CU was regionalism. Shortly after Caldera was inaugurated in 1969, he issued decree number 72 separating the nation into eight major regions (Carabaño, 1970, p. 32). This move toward regionalization encompassed most of the government's ministries, including the Ministry of Education and specifically higher education. According to Heres (1978, p. 21), Caldera's intent was to address regional differences with regional institutions which would respond to the vocational, economic, and cultural needs of that area. In addition, more opportunity and access would be provided the students because they could now attend institutions of higher education in their own locale. He

stated these goals specifically in his dedication speech for the CU at Los Teques (Heres, 1978, pp. 129-130).

Examples of how regionalization is reflected in the curriculum can be seen by examining the offerings of several CU. At the Colegio Universitario de Carupano on the coast students can obtain a técnico superior (superior technician) degree in naval and fishing technology as well as agricultural technology. By contrast, the superior technician degrees offered by the Colegio Universitario Francisco de Miranda in Caracas emphasizes education, transportation, and hydrocarbon technology. In Maracaibo where most of Venezuela's oil is produced, the colegio universitario there stresses metallurgy, steel and mineral technology (CNU/OPSU, 1980, pp. 10-11).

Several interviewees confirmed regionalism as a factor in the development of CU. One professor at a CU said that the economic needs of the area was a definite rationale for their creation. Greater student access was cited by a university official as an accomplishment of CU. By putting CU in easily accessible locales, more people were able to attend and at less cost than going to out-of-town universities. This has allowed an influx of non-traditional students to attend.

The three-tiered rationale used by Caldera to create the CU was inherently interconnected. While achieving the goals of regionalization and diversification, the problem of access was addressed. A major objective of diversification was to provide an alternative to the traditional universities. This was also a goal of regionalization where students could now attend area institutions and become employed locally. The democratization of higher education additionally addresses the idea of providing non-traditional students the opportunity for postsecondary education when before there was no alternative. Although each rationale

for CU emphasized a particular idea, taken together they approached the perceived problems of higher education in a systematic interrelated way.

Present Scope and Structure

From the initial three CU created in the early 1970's, the public system expanded to seven in 1981. All CU are located in urban areas, with Caracas having four. The other three are located in Carúpano, Maracaibo, and Cabimas (CNU/OPSU, 1980, p. 17). There were five private CU in 1981. All the CU, whether public or private, had at least a two semester requirement of general studies or cíclo básico (CNU, 1980, pp. 55-59). This general studies component of 20 to 25 credits, usually consisted of a core of courses covering such subjects as: mathematics, sociology, communications, logic, and a foreign language normally English or French. The other five to ten credits for the cíclo básico were spread among electives and preprofessional courses.

The cíclo profesional is made up of 60-65 credits. The following disciplines were included in this cycle: agriculture, oceanography, health related sciences, teacher education, economics, social sciences, humanities, architecture, and engineering. The most popular disciplines in 1979 were education, architecture, engineering, economics, and social sciences (CNU/OPSU, 1980, p. 41). Upon termination the student may graduate with a técnico superior degree and join the work force or theoretically continue on at a university and obtain a bachelor's degree or the licenciatura (CULT, 1980, p. 5; CUC, 1981, p. 7).

The size of the public CU ranged from 110 students to over 4,000 with the average being 1,420. Both night and day classes were available with night offerings more popular in the more urbanized areas like Caracas.

Although statistical data about student characteristics of the CU are virtually non-existent, there were data available about a similar type institution, as defined by the Ministry of Education under the general heading of superior (higher) short-cycle education, the Instituto Universitario Pedagógico J.M. Siso Martínez, in Caracas. The study involved 223 students with 87 percent male and 13 percent female at the institute during the 1978-1979 academic year. According to a magazine published by the Institute, Innovación (1980, pp. 19-20), 71 percent of their students were between the ages of 17 to 26 with the median age being 24. Of this group, 35 percent were married and 70 percent were employed. The median income of those that worked was Bs.2,425 or $565.27 per month. One of the more revealing groups of statistics was that concerning the motivational characteristics of students. In reporting reasons for attending the institution, 35 percent said that they were there for vocational reasons. The curriculum and location of the institution was cited by 18 percent of the sample as a reason for enrolling there. Immediate opportunity for employment was the choice of seven percent of the students in the survey. In addition, 61 percent of the students stated that they were well informed about the curriculum and majors in the institution. Finally, .5 percent said they went to this institute because of tradition or influence of family and only two percent responded that social prestige was an important reason for attendance.

As mentioned earlier, these statistics are not from a CU but from a similar type institution as defined by the Ministry of Education under the general heading of superior short-cycle education. They do, however, appear to confirm the notion stated previously that the short-cycle postsecondary institutions and CU by association have had a democratizing

effect on higher education by providing access to lower income, non-traditional students. In contrast to short-cycle students, university students are usually from the upper strata of society, not working while attending school, major in the traditional subjects of law, medicine, and engineering, who go to the university because of its prestige value and not for vocational purposes, and usually are not faced with earning a living with his/her degree.

Another possible criterion to measure the democratizing effect of the CU in higher education, that is by allowing non-traditional students into the universities through CU or into occupations generally closed to these students, is the success rate of the students as measured by the number that graduate. In Caracas, of the two institutions studied, the CU of Caracas graduated the most students with four percent or 106 of their total enrollment in 1976, six percent or 235 in 1977, and 14 percent or 593 in 1978. Enrollments were: 2,557, 3,465, and 4,223 during the same respective years. The CU of Francisco Miranda graduated two percent or 35 in 1977 and five percent or 112 in 1978. Enrollments during these years were 1,357 and 2,040 respectively. At the CU in Los Teques, ten percent or 63 praduated in 1976, 12 percent or 123 in 1977, and eight percent or 82 in 1978. The enrollment figures were 606, 1,003, and 986 respectively (CNU/OPSU, 1980, pp. 34; 62). With each of the institutions the percentage of graduates steadily increased with enrollments producing a high of 14 percent in 1978 at the CU of Caracas and a low of two percent in 1977 at the CU of Francisco Miranda which was the first year for graduates at that institution. This compares to the Universidad Central de Venezuela success rate of .05 percent in 1976, .04 percent in 1977, and .05 percent in 1978 (CNU/OPSU, 1980, pp. 38; 60).

Problem Areas

Even with the success in meeting some of the goals for creating the CU, there do appear to be some problem areas. One problem area is the lack of articulation between the CU and the universities. The decree that set up the original articulation agreement was number 1574, article 52 in January, 1974 (CUFM, 1975, p. 9). The spirit of this decree was restated in the regulations governing the CU in Article 13, number 2, especially with reference to the prominent role of the University of Simón Rodríguez in accepting the CU transfer students (CUFM, 1975, pp. 7-8).

Even though the latest move by the government to mandate articulation between these types of postsecondary institutions was decree number 42 in March 1979, by President Luis H. Campíns (CUFM, Note 6), problems still eixst. The most recent data suggest that the Ministry of Education is just beginning to address the problem seriously. For example, although the catalog of the University of Simón Rodríguez states they do accept transfer students from CU, there were no official documents found by this writer to identify them or substantiate any CU student attending any university. What was found were documents confirming the activity of the Ministry to try and resolve the problem of articulation according to a publication by CUFM (Note 6). Discussions to solve this problem dates back to July 1977, when the Consejo Nacional de Universidades stated that a curriculum should be created that would facilitate the transferring between the universities and the university institutes/ colleges of superior education.

More recently, the Director of Superior Education, Oscar Garcia Arenas, stated that there are agreements being prepared to allow for the transfer of students from short-cycle postsecondary institutions to universities and horizontal transfer between short-cycle institutions

("Pasos concretos en...," 1981). This proposition mainly affects universitarios de tecnología. One proposed area for cooperation would be in Yaracuy where the instituto tecnológico would provide the cíclo básico for the pedagogical institute and the university there. In Caracas, students majoring in metallurgy and engineering from the Instituto Universitario de Tecnología de la Región Capital (IUT) will be able to transfer to the University Central de Venezuela (UCV). Additionally, students majoring in computer science will be able to transfer from IUT to UCV and the Universidad de Simón Bolivar. Other such cooperation was to take place in Maracaibo, Cumaná, and Puerto Cabello in electronics and mechanical engineering.

The only documentation involving a CU and a possible articulation agreement with a university was in Caracas involving the Colegio Universitario de Francisco de Miranda (CUFM) and UCV. In 1979 a meeting took place in order to begin a pilot project to integrate the curriculum of four postsecondary short-cycle institutions and UCV. The short-cycle institutions included two polytechnics, one technological, and CUFM. The agreement concerning CUFM called for UCV to accept students having received their técnico superior degree in education in whatever field and allow them to continue and obtain their licenciado en educación (B.A. degree). Agreements were to be worked out on the make-up of the cíclo básico at CUFM to conform with the requirements at UCV. After spending two to two and one-half years at CUFM the student would be able to transfer to UCV and obtain his/her degree in education after two and one-half to three years. A total of five and one-half or six years would be spent in getting a degree by transfer students as compared to five years by the native student. The plan was to implement the proposition by the Fall of 1981 (Boyer, Note 5).

In addition, Arenas proposed the creation of a National Council of Superior (higher) Education, a Regional Commission of Superior (higher) Education, and a National Commission of University Institutes. These groups were to coordinate and promote the articulation agreements among the various universities and area postsecondary short-cycle institutions ("Pasos concretos en...," 1981).

All interviewees agreed that the lack of articulation between CU and the universities was a major problem area. The universities historically have been generally unwilling to discuss anything with the CU seriously. This reticence no doubt dates back to the initial objections expressed by the universities concerning the founding of CU analyzed previously. In addition, according to a university official, the professors at the CU are not respected by their university colleagues and therefore the universities feel no particular need to cooperate with them.

A potentially more serious problem, according to a former Minister of Education, is the abuse of the power of autonomy by the universities. Faculties of a university college are extremely powerful and are able virtually to run their college as they see fit. They have substantial input on entrance requirements to their college, curriculum, appointing and dismissing deans, and have representation on councils that run the university. According to this observer, autonomy as practiced generally in Venezuela has meant chaos in the universities. Each college (facultad) goes its own way without any particular concern for the overall well-being of the university. Because of this structure, cooperation among facultades is rare and among universities even less likely. The idea of a university cooperating with a CU then is somewhat overly idealistic.

Most of those interviewed said that the CU perceived lack of 'prestige' has also slowed any movement towards articulation with the

universities. Even Simón Rodríguez the university designated to receive CU transfers, has now begun to accept freshmen; moreover, it requires additional credits from transfer students or does not accept a portion of those presented for admission.

Officials at all CU acknowledged some limited personal cooperation regarding particular disciplines at a CU and at a particular university. The universities involved do not officially recognize these informal understandings although they are apparently functioning. One such arrangement was that between individuals at the Colegio Universitario Francisco Miranda and individuals at the Universidad Central de Venezuela concerning education majors. Another included individuals at the Colegio Universitario de Los Teques and individuals at the Universidad de Simón Rodríguez, again in education. It was also a common practice, according to respondents, for CU to allow transfers from another CU those students who have completed their ciclo básico. Once a student had started his/her ciclo profesional, transfers were less common and more difficult.

There is another problem area with the theoretical model of the CU and its mission of providing the community with needed trained technicians. According to Mata (1979; Ortega, 1981), there are serious problems with the ability of the CU de Los Teques to provide the kinds of trained technicians needed by the community. In a study he did in 1979 and updated in 1981 three problem areas are addressed. The first concerns the ability of students to find jobs for which they were trained. Mata notes that in 1981 of the 300 students that he interviewed that had graduated, 149 were curriculum and instruction majors (recursos para el apprendizaje). Only three of the 149 worked in their speciality. Graduates not only have a hard time in finding jobs in their specialty but employers stated that they either do not know how these graduates

can help them or are unaware they even exist. In addition, it was becoming painfully obvious that the CU at Los Teques was not providing the kinds of majors and curriculum desired by the community, as indicated by employer's comments in the study.

Mata reports in his 1979 study, based on 36 employer interviews in Los Teques, whether or not graduates from the CU were well prepared. Sixty-seven percent (24) could not answer because they had never employed a graduate. Thirty-one percent (11) said they had never heard of the institution or of its programs. In addition, 70 percent of the 300 graduates since 1972 were in three major discipline areas: curriculum and instruction, 50 percent; school administration, 6 percent; and business, 6 percent. Of these, only 18 percent were employed in their specialty area.

These 1979 findings were replicated in 1981 when Mata polled local industry and businesses and found the greatest need was for technicians (técnico superior) in industrial metal mechanics followed by accountants. The current catalog of the CU at Los Teques shows no degree program in either of these subject areas (CULT, 1980, p. 10). Mata's report confirms that the programs offered by the institution apparently do not correspond with the expressed needs of the local employers.

The issues documented by Mata were substantiated by those interviewed and were apparently symptomatic of other related problem areas. In responding to the problem of graduates not being able to find employment, officials at the universities, CU including Los Teques, and the Ministry faulted the government for not educating the public about the CU. One example of this type of reaction was reported to the interviewer by at least five different sources. The secondary system as well as two CU studied train students to be employed as pre-school teachers. At the

time of this study, it was rare that a graduate from a CU pre-school program was employed since preference was usually given to the secondary school graduate even though the CU graduate had three years more preparation. The problem, according to those interviewed, was that the government in general and the Ministry specifically had not done their public relations job of explaining to the employers the advantage of having a more highly trained CU graduate as an employee. Since the Ministry controls all levels of education, there should have been some measures taken to alleviate this problem. Respondents agreed with Mata that graduates from other programs had this problem but not to the same degree as education majors. Graduates in business and accounting programs had less trouble in finding employment.

The other major issue raised by Mata, that of the programs at CU not meeting community needs, was related to the first in that it reflects the lack of planning for these institutions by the government. One reason for this, according to a director of a pedagogical institute, is that with each change of government come changes in educational policy and direction. Each new policy is built on top of the existing system whether or not it is adaptable. A professor at a CU noted that in the beginning, even though policy statements said otherwise, CU were mainly meant to serve as a conduit to the university. Although the terminal degree vocational aspect was and is policy, many if not most of the students, according to informants including students, are planning to finish at a university. What usually happens, according to the students, is that the CU is used as a stopping off place until the student is accepted at the university.

The terminal degree though is a central part of the program of the CU. What has occurred, observes a director of planning at a CU, is that

programs are initiated which lack any input from the community or valid research as to the demand. Coupled with the lack of effort on the part of the Ministry to educate the public and employers about the benefits of a terminal CU degree, the degree programs at the CU are suffering. In addition, a CU professor states there is a tendency to create programs that may meet national needs but not regional ones. This produces graduates without jobs as in the case at Los Teques.

These problems, along with others confronting the CU, could be solved observes a former Minister of Education. What is needed, he states, is more support from the government in the form of money and belief in the system. The government must convince the public that carreas cortas are a good idea and make sure they compliment the university programs. That is a técnico superior in electrical engineering should be able to work well with an ingeniero in electrical engineering.

Another problem, according to the former Minister, is free higher education, a strong tradition in Venezuela. Students do not pay for postsecondary education in Venezuela and are not penalized for repeating years or changing majors as often as they like. This encourages students to continue on indefinitely and discourages them in taking higher education seriously. Going to school becomes a vocation.

The cost to the government for those who repeat a grade is high, even though repeating is widespread, accepted, and customary in Venezuela and most other Latin American nations. Zambrano (1978) studied five teacher's colleges in Venezuela from 1970-1977. The overall repetition rate at all colleges was 51.8 percent at a cost of $1,308 per repeater per year. His study included 4,236 students at a total cost to the government of $5,541,591.

This situation does not help CU. Students rationalize why go to a CU when one can go to the university if there is space for the same matriculation costs, zero. The former Minister suggests that only the poorest but able students and those who are academically superior should merit scholarships. The rest should pay at least a portion of the cost of their education. This kind of action by the government would, along with efforts to convince the public that CU are worthwhile, help CU enrollments and aid in solving the space problem by eliminating repeaters.

Even though there do seem to be serious problems with the CU, all those interviewed are certain that they can and will be solved. Movement has begun by the Ministry of Education and Presidential decrees to address the articulation issue and there is no doubt that officials are at least aware of the other problems. Finally, an important element not previously noted but mentioned by all those interviewed was the determination of those involved with CU to improve them and the desire to keep their unique identity and not become another traditional university.

The Future of Colegios Universitarios

When projecting into the future about the growth of the post-secondary short-cycle system in Venezuela, several factors become evident. Brito and Garcia (Note 1), in studying employment trends, reemphasize the need for the kinds of programs that CU offer. They note that the work force has grown at an annual rate of 4.53 percent between 1971-1976 but new jobs have increased only at an annual rate of 4.19 percent during the same period. The discrepancy between the growth of the economy and therefore the work force and available jobs had eventually produced an unemployment rate of 6.4 percent in 1976.

The jobs that were available required more highly trained personnel including técnico superiores, engineers, and other highly trained technicians. The need for these new workers was increasing at an annual rate (1971-1979) of 41 percent for specialized workers and 49 percent for technically trained personnel. These trends will no doubt accelerate as Venezuela's economy and population continue to grow.

The current Ministry of Education agrees with Brito and Garcia's projections on the importance of short-cycle institutions by planning for them to enroll 30 percent of the higher education student population by 1985. The university is still projected to lead in enrollments with 66 percent of the student population. But such a projection would more than double the number of students in short-cycle institutions between 1980-1985 (OSPP, 1980). In addition, the VI Plan of the Ministry predicts better articulation between all short-cycle institutions and the universities and more construction money for expansion of all higher education facilities at all levels (OSPP, 1980). The desire of the government to enhance economic growth through higher education, and to diversify higher education and opportunity for students seems to be confirmed by these projections.

In conclusion, higher education in Venezuela has undergone some rather radical changes in the last decade. Most of these changes have been caused by the tremendous pressure put on the system forcing it to expand. This expansion has generally occurred in two ways. One way has been the creation of various regional universities. The other method of expansion has been the creation of a number of short-cycle post-secondary institutions including colegios universitarios. Several reasons have been given for the creation of these institutions including--the democratization of higher education, providing more and diversified

opportunities for students, regionalization, weakening the universities' control over higher education, and providing more highly trained technical/mid-level management personnel for economic growth.

Although the CU do have problems, some of them serious ones, the officials who manage them are apparently willing to do what is necessary to insure they continue to progress and be a viable part of the higher educational establishment of the country. Finally, as indicated by the interviews analyzed, government support has not been as generous as deemed necessary. But, even with this past record of limited support, the government appears to be committed to these short-cycle institutions as indicated by the VI National Plan's projection of increased enrollments and financial commitment through 1985.

CHAPTER 4
COLEGIOS UNIVERSITARIOS IN VENEZUELA

In this chapter, the findings that described the development of colegios universitarios in Venezuela are analyzed in light of the following four research questions:

1. To what extent was the development of colegios universitarios a means by which Venezuela attempted to democratize higher education, that is to provide more education to more people and to provide an alternative type of higher education in lieu of traditional university education?

2. To what degree did foreign influence have a role in the development of the colegios universitarios?

3. How prevalent was the support of the major political parties for the development of the colegios universitarios and to what extent did the 1970 University Law affect this development?

4. Was the development of Venezuelan higher education consistent with the Bowles' model?

Democratization and Non-traditional Higher Education

It is clear that the development of colegios universitarios (CU) were intended to begin the democratization of higher education in Venezuela. The original documentation (Caricote, 1972) describing the rationale behind the CU is very explicit on this point as were pronoucements by Rafael Caldera who was President at that time. Recent official documents as well as a host of other official documents dating from as early as 1960 emphasize democratization as a major issue in

higher education and that the short-cycle system of institutions is addressing this concern. Interviewees were unanimous in stating that democratization (even using the direct translation of the word in Spanish when replying) of higher education was a major reason for developing CU.

It also became apparent from the interviews and documentation obtained in Venezuela that democratization meant more than just expansion. As noted in the magazine Innovación (1980), short-cycle postsecondary institutions are attracting a different kind of student than the universities. These students tend to be older, holding jobs, seeking postsecondary education for primarily vocational reasons, first in a family to attend an institution of higher learning, not concerned about the prestige of the institution, and from the lower economic/social strata of society. Although these types of students do attend the universities, larger numbers are evidently attending short-cycle institutions.

The regionalization notion initiated by the Caldera administration also mentioned by Caricote (1972), was intended to help in the democratization process. This was to be done by placing CU in regions more accessible to students.

Colegios universitarios additionally were to serve as a conduit to the university by providing the first phase of course work for a baccalaureate (licenciatura) degree opening up the universities to more non-traditional students. Students who for various reasons did not attend the university were able to begin at a CU and then transfer to a university. The principle again was to make higher education accessible to more people. As has been discussed, there are problems with this model but the concept is still consistent with the intent of making higher education more democratic.

Providing non-traditional higher education has always been a priority for the CU. Again, Caricote (1972) stresses the importance of CU in providing the national economy with técnico superiores. These mid-level managers and higher technicians were not being supplied by the traditional professional school-oriented universities. The government saw short-cycle institutions as a way to produce a better trained work force and also provide students with an alternative to traditional university training.

Foreign Influence

The most prevalent foreign influence in the development of CU were the community college systems in California and New York. These two states were visited by officials of the Ministry in the early 1970's and according to Yelvington (1979) the visits to California continued into the mid-1970's. The structure of CU mirror somewhat their counterparts in the United States. The CU provide transfer curriculum to the university, two to three year terminal degree programs, have most of their classes at night, appeal to non-traditional students, and are located geographically to facilitate access.

Respondents substantiated the influence of the United States community college model in the creation and development of CU. One respondent, a former Minister of Education, was a member of the commission sent by the Ministry to study the community colleges in the United States. The move by the government to make provisions for better access (i.e., for non-traditional students; democratizing higher education) to higher education and provide an alternative to traditional university schooling were the primary reasons for using the United States model, according to the former Minister.

The government wanted higher education to be more responsive to the economic needs of the nation and the universities, according to several interviewees, were not responding satisfactorily. The CU alternative allows students to obtain the técnico superior terminal degree in three years or less and enter the job market. Unlike the United States model with its vocational advisory boards, the CU do not have a close working relationship with potential employers. This deficiency is causing problems for graduates who at times are unable to be employed in their specialty.

The United States model also had the advantage of incorporating transfer programs to universities. This feature would address the access and space concerns of the government. The CU though did not follow the United States model in obtaining specific articulation agreements with the universities as most community college systems have in the various states. Because of this, even with the government designating the University of Simón Rodríguez to accept these students, the university bound graduates of the CU have a difficult time transferring any or all of their CU credits. This problem was substantiated by officials at two universities and all respondents at the colegios universitarios visited.

Political Party Support and the 1970 University Law

Support for the creation and continued development of CU by both major political parties (COPEI and AD) has been uninterrupted since the CU beginnings in 1972. The CU were created during the COPEI presidency of Rafael Caldera. Movement to institute changes in higher education though, especially enhancing access, has been a concern of all political parties since 1958 and earlier during the treinio (1945-1948).

Since Caldera's incumbency from 1968-1973, the government has changed twice, first to AD and then to the present administration of COPEI President Campíns. During this period, appropriations for CU have increased at a more rapid rate than appropriations for universities. Current support for CU is evident in Campíns decree number 42 in 1979 directing the universities and the short-cycle system, including post-secondary institutes and CU, to work out articulation agreements between the systems. Future support for CU is apparently assured as indicated by the VI Plan (1981-1985) for national development. The Ministry of Education is projecting increased growth in enrollments and appropriations for CU.

Although the political support for CU seems not to follow any party line, there were indications by interviewees and the documentation that certain aspects of the CU were emphasized during different administrations. During the first few years of the CU covering two administrations (COPEI and AD) the apparent emphasis was on access, that is opening up as many CU as possible to allow more students into the postsecondary system (All public CU were created before 1978). The present administration is now responding to problems not stressed earlier including the articulation question and the vocational programs of the CU.

The evidence of the effect of the 1970 University Law on the development of CU is less clear. The content of the law, initiated by AD President Leoni but enacted by COPEI President Caldera, was obviously meant to attempt to control the size and demand for government appropriations by the universities as well as the power of university faculties and students. Tangentially related were the government's concerns with the nation's economic growth, the lack of wider access to higher education, and the power of student groups, especially the more radical left

wing one. The COPEI administration at the time saw a need for more highly trained technicians and mid-level managers to ensure the continued expansion of the economy. The universities were not producing these kinds of graduates. In addition, with the tremendous growth in newly qualified potential first year students because of changes in the secondary system, the universities were unable to handle this demand and there was a lack of space for qualified students. Finally, the government had been concerned for some time about student groups and the power they wielded, especially their ability to close down the universities with student strikes almost at will.

When these concerns of the government were coupled with the University Law of 1970, the practical result, according to a former Minister of Education, was the creation of institutos and colegios universitarios. He states that with these new institutions the perceived economic and access questions were approached with an apparently satisfactory solution. There was also the hope that with larger numbers of students attending these more tightly controlled institutions, there would be fewer problems with student groups and the disruption of classes.

These moves by the government have met with some success. There has been less disruption of classes by student groups since 1970 and the power of these groups is not as potent as before 1970 (Arnove, 1977). The universities are growing in appropriations and enrollments but at a slower rate. And better access and alternatives to university training have been provided by the new short-cycle institutions breaking the virtual monopoly universities had over higher education.

It is evident then that although there was not a cause and effect relationship between the 1970 University Law and the development of CU,

the law no doubt created the atmosphere for developing the CU system and certainly, at the very least, served as a catalyst for change.

The Bowles Model

The Bowles Model was chosen for this study because it was the only one found where the patterns of educational development were specifically designed for Third World nations. In the model an educational system must go through the first four stages of development before being able to devise new and unique ways of delivering higher education in stage five. Stage three is considered crucial because here a national commitment is made to generalize all levels of basic education to reach 50 percent of the 6-12 age group. In this analysis stages three and five will be emphasized.

Stages one and two in the model describe the formation of a basic national educational system. This system includes primary, vocational, and teacher training schools to the development of the university with undergraduate studies and first professional degrees but with no graduate or research programs. The goal here is to provide for ten percent or more of the student population.

Venezuela's educational development does not closely parallel stages one and two. The first university (1721) was created long before anywhere near ten percent of the appropriate student aged population was attending school. By 1848, only one of every 114 school aged persons was educated in Venezuela (Silvert & Reissman, 1976, p. 145). Even in 1926, just .03 percent of the total population had attended school at all levels or 113,000 (including 710 at the Central University) out of an estimated population of 3,026,878 (Ministerio de Educación, 1929, pp. 458; 628-9).

Stage three does seem to parallel more closely educational development in Venezuela. In this stage there is a national resolve to extend the basic national education system as described in stage one to reach up to 50 percent of the 6 to 12 age group. This movement occurred in Venezuela during the trienio from 1945 to 1948. During this period the percentage of primary aged children attending school increased from 30 to 36. Efforts were also made to expand educational access although it did not reach 50 percent of the appropriate population, 6 to 12.

During the Perez Jimenez dictatorship public education suffered. Between 1948-1950, Monroy (Note 3) states that the public proportion of primary enrollment dropped from 85 to 81 percent as did the secondary school proportion from 76 to 55 percent. In addition, illiteracy rose from 33 percent in 1950 to 57 percent in 1958, and only 32 percent of the school age population (7 to 24 years old) actually attended school.

The activity described in stage three again took place after Pérez Jiménez was overthrown with the return of democracy under the leadership of Betancourt. By 1968, 61 percent of the relevant age group was in primary school and 34 percent in secondary schools as compared to 44 and 11 percent respectively in 1955 (UNESCO, 1969, p. 18).

In terms of this analysis of Bowles' model, stage four is still taking place in Venezuela. Stage four is when the university matures with emerging graduate and research programs relating to national problems and there is full faculty training in some fields. Graduate and research programs are limited in Venezuela. According to Waggoner, (1978, p. 4330) agreement on graduate programs nation-wide has not occurred among the appropriate education agencies. The doctorate degree still has not been clearly defined except for medicine. Training for faculty to teach in institutions of higher education has usually

taken place only in the professional schools of law, medicine, and engineering and in the schools of education.

It does seem though that Venezuela is accomplishing most of stage five. In stage five higher education extends its role reaching out to communities, developing new methods of educational delivery, and creating national service programs to meet political necessities. With the creation of its postsecondary short-cycle system, Venezuela has extended the role of higher education reaching out to communities, and creating a new method of educational delivery. No doubt the short-cycle system has the potential of creating national service programs to meet political necessities (i.e., VISTA or Job Corps type programs).

It appears that Venezuela parallels the Bowles model at specific points in its educational history. Although there were some parallels in stages one, two, and four, there were direct similarities between the model and reality in stages three and five.

Summary

Colegios universitarios were created to effect several interrelated goals. The most important goal was to begin to democratize higher education by improving access to postsecondary institutions. One way to improve access was to offer university parallel curriculum at the CU for those students who wanted to transfer to a university. But if a student chose not to transfer to a university, there was an alternative in the short-cycle técnico superior degree. The student could enter the work force upon termination of his/her short-cycle program and at the same time aid the economy by providing it with much needed skills. In addition, the access goal was to be met with the regionalism concept of Caldera by placing CU in various parts of the

country making them more convenient to students. Although there are problems with the transfer program and the placement of graduates, the CU have helped to democratize higher education in Venezuela.

Foreign influence in the development of CU came from the comprehensive community college systems in California and New York. Although many features of these colleges are mirrored in the CU, two major ones are not. The CU still do not have satisfactory articulation agreements with the universities. Additionally, the CU do not have the kind of close relationship with potential employers of graduates enjoyed by most United States community colleges. These issues are presently being addressed by officials of the CU and the Ministry of Education.

All major political parties in Venezuela have supported without reservation the creation and development of CU. Different administrations have emphasized different aspects of the CU, but support has been continuous and is expected to be as strong in the future.

Finally, the Bowles model at stages three and five was useful in helping to explain the development of CU in Venezuela. Stages one and two paralleled the development of Venezuelan education only intermittently. Stage four seemed to be in the process of being accomplished. Stages three and five mirrored the development of Venezuelan higher education. These stages accurately predicted that once the basic education system is in place and reaching at least 50 percent of the appropriate population, the resulting flow of students will create pressure for better access at the secondary level and inevitably at the postsecondary level. New ways of delivering higher education to meet the demand are created. This occurred in Venezuela resulting in the creation of the short-cycle postsecondary system including colegios universitarios.

CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY, COMMENTARY, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Summary

Short-cycle postsecondary higher education has become a world-wide phenomenon. It exists as independent institutions in Japan and Yugoslavia or it may be associated with a university such as in India and Norway. The programs offered range from two to six week refresher courses to three-year programs that include vocational/occupational curriculum to college/university transfer programs. The most comprehensive and largest system is in the United States where community colleges now enroll approximately half of all students in higher education there; 4.89 million students (AACJC, 1982). These institutions included not only the generally common vocational/occupational and university parallel curricula, but also remedial education and adult and continuing education curricula.

Latin America has also developed short-cycle postsecondary educational programs in: Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico, Costa Rica, Chile, the Dominican Republic, and Panama (Martorana, 1981). Most of the institutions in Latin America concentrated on vocational/occupational curriculum. There were attempts in Colombia in the 1960's as detailed in Chapter 1 to create institutions based on the comprehensive model in the United States. This effort failed and by the early 1970's all of these institutions were regional universities (ICFES, 1977, p. 58; Jacobsen, 1968, pp. 9-13).

The exception to this trend was in Venezuela. There, in 1972, a system of public colegios universitarios (CU) was started and by

1982 had expanded to seven institutions. The unique feature about the CU was their university parallel curriculum with its general education or *ciclo básico* component. The author found no other short-cycle postsecondary institution in Latin America offering a similar curriculum.

In addition, Venezuela in 1982 has become a nation of some importance. It has vast oil reserves and is a major supplier to the United States (Morganti, 1981). It has the highest per capita income in Latin America (Pan Am's world guide, 1981). Venezuela is a leader in the Third World through its activities in international organizations and a founding member of OPEC. It is the only viable democracy in South America and has been that way since 1958.

Given the significance of Venezuela's unique development of CU, its prominent position of leadership in Latin America and the Third World, and the general lack of scholarly research on current Venezuelan higher education in the United States, this study was undertaken. The following four questions served as the foundation and framework for the research:

1. To what extent was the development of *colegios universitarios* a means for Venezuela to democratize postsecondary education and to provide an alternative to students in lieu of traditional university professional education?

2. To what degree was foreign influence important in the development of the *colegios universitarios*?

3. Did all the major political parties support the development of *colegios universitarios* and to what extent did the 1970 University Law affect this development?

4. Was the development of colegios universitarios consistent with Bowles' model and his patterns of educational development?

The study design utilized a combination of historical and retrospective survey techniques. They were used in such a way as to minimize sources of invalidity normally associated with the case-study approach. The study design also incorporated a field study in Venezuela to conduct interviews with knowledgeable observers, visit three of the seven public CU, and obtain documentation there unavailable in the United States. Based on the results of prior related research the interview guide to be used in Venezuela was developed and a set of research expectations formulated. The interview guide was further refined in response to feedback from a pilot interview. The final phase of data gathering was accomplished by the visit to Venezuela. There additional data were collected and interviews conducted with respondents considered knowledgeable about the development of CU. It was assumed that the interviewees had the ability to identify the major issues involved in the creation and development of CU, and were willing to discuss such insights.

Interview data and documentation obtained in Venezuela indicated that the creation and development of the CU was intended to expand and democratize higher education. The government was concerned with better access so that a broader spectrum of Venezuelans had the opportunity to attend an institution of higher education. The CU also gave students an alternative to the traditional university professional training by offering the técnico superior degree allowing the student to enter the job market in less time.

Foreign influence was extensive in the development of the CU. The major influence was the community college system in the United States, specifically the systems in California and New York. Improving access

and providing an alternative to university training were the most important features of the United States model for the Venezuelans. Certain aspects of the United States model were not adopted such as articulation with the university system and close cooperation with potential employers utilizing such groups as vocational advisory councils. These two issues have caused problems for the CU.

All major political parties have supported the development of CU in an uninterrupted manner. This support also seems assured for the future. There was evidence that different administrations emphasized certain aspects of the CU over other features. In the beginning access was emphasized, now the present government is concerned with the articulation question. The 1970 University Law did not seem to affect directly the development of CU. But in the milieu of Venezuelan higher education at the time, the change in attitudes toward the universities after the passage of the 1970 Law no doubt served as a catalyst for the creation and continued development of CU.

The Bowles model was useful in helping to explain the development of CU. As in the model, after Venezuela had created a basic national educational system that reached at least 50 percent of the appropriate aged group (stage three) it was ready to expand its higher educational delivery system. According to Bowles, this expansion should result in new types of delivery systems for higher education (stage five), in Venezuela's case, the CU. Although the model was not totally accurate in predicting Venezuelan patterns of educational development, stages three and five were accurate and useful.

The development of CU in Venezuela was an attempt by that nation to democratize higher education and provide alternatives to students who may not want a university education. Foreign influence was extensive

in the form of the United States community college model. All major political parties have supported the development of CU and the 1970 University Law seems to have acted as a catalyst for the creation of CU. Finally, the Bowles model at stages three and five, was useful in helping to explain the development of the CU.

Commentary

The study of the development of CU and Venezuela generally was rather an astounding experience for this writer. While the writer has had some prior acquaintance with Latin America, the experience in Venezuela obviously did not not fit the generally accepted stereotype of a Latin American nation. In the midst of dictatorships and poverty is a nation with a viable democracy and prosperity. While many Latin American nations are static and repressive, Venezuela appears to be active and creative. This is a national that nationalized all the private oil companies and then created three competing government oil companies. Venezuela was a founding member of OPEC but refused to participate in the 1973 oil embargo and even increased its exports to the United States.

The higher educational system of Venezuela did not have a short-cycle system in 1970. By 1980, they had a public short-cycle system with 29 institutos and colegios universitarios enrolling 20.17 percent of all students in higher education. In 1972, there were no public CU. In 1980, there were seven public CU enrolling 4.56 percent of all students in higher education (Brito & Garcia, Note 1). Although the entire educational system has expanded rapidly, the short-cycle system is the fastest growing sector in higher education and the CU are the fastest growing unit within the short-cycle system (CNU/OPSU, 1980; Brito & Garcia, Note 1).

Ever since the overthrow of Pérez Jiménez in 1958, Venezuela has provided generous support to education generally and higher education specifically.

This support has continued to be based on the notion that to be able to perfect the democratic order a nation must have an educated citizenry (CORDIPLAN, 1960, p. 1).

The government now seems intent to assure not only an educated society for democracy but a democratic educational system. This is being accomplished by making education more of a public function instead of a private one, especially at the secondary level. In higher education the government has created the short-cycle system to provide more opportunity for more people. And although economic concerns were an important part of the decision making process in creating the short-cycle system, the development of the CU indicate the democratic nature of the decision by having university parallel transfer curriculum. The idea here of course was to increase the opportunities to the populace for university education; democratize the system. This system has also meant that students now have a viable alternative to university training in the técnico superior degree. So while the short-cycle system has helped to democratize higher education and provide viable alternatives to students, it has for the first time in Venezuela broken the monopoly on higher education once enjoyed by the universities. An additional benefit of the short-cycle system is to provide the economy with much needed trained manpower in the area of mid-level management and highly trained technicians (Brito & Garcia, Note 1).

All interviewees from all sectors of the higher educational system also made a point of expressing their commitment to the continued success of the CU and desire to assure that the CU remain a viable and integral part of the postsecondary system. These comments were especially interesting since some of them came from officials in the universities. Additionally, those officials in the Ministry from the secondary system

expressed support for the CU. The most critical comments, from this writer's point of view, came from respondents in the CU. Officials there were not reticent about discussing the deficiencies of the CU. This was especially true concerning the problems of articulation, graduate placement, and general attitude of the public toward CU. The important point here though, is that these problems among others are recognized by CU officials and the Ministry and attempts are being made to resolve them.

It is apparent then that in Venezuelan higher education, the short-cycle system including CU will continue to be an integral part of the system and become an even more important component in the future.

Finally, one of the reasons for this study was to ascertain if the experiences by Venezuela in developing their short-cycle postsecondary system could be generalized for use by other Third World nations. The use of the Bowles model was also chosen for this reason to see if its patterns of educational development could be generalized.

All the respondents agreed that short-cycle postsecondary education was a useful form of higher education for Third World nations. But at the same time, all respondents were hesitant to recommend specifically the Venezuelan experience as a guide for other nations on how to create and develop a short-cycle system. Respondents stated that because Venezuela was democratic and relatively prosperous, their experience might not transfer very well to other nations. Obviously Haiti or Chile have a hard time accepting a system that would "democratize" anything much less higher education. And, although short-cycle education would cost less to develop than university education, if a nation had the university system already functioning, to create another could be too costly.

The Bowles model does seem to indicate in Venezuela's case that after a certain efficiency is reached at the secondary level, pressure is put on the postsecondary level to provide for more students. After stage three where at least 50 percent of the appropriate aged populace is attending the basic educational system, the pressures from this flow seem to lead to stage five. Here the postsecondary system creates new ways of educational delivery to serve the population and its demand for access.

The Bowles model does appear to be useful to educational practitioners as a general guide for planning educational systems in Third World nations. When a nation has its basic educational system in place and at least 50 percent of the relevant population is attending school, that nation may want to prepare for a tremendous increase in demand for secondary and postsecondary education. At the postsecondary level, new ways of educational delivery may be necessary. The experiences of Venezuela may prove useful in creating a relatively inexpensive short-cycle system.

Recommendations for Further Study

When Venezuelan experts visited the United States to study the community college model and decided on the use of certain features and not others, what was the process used? Further research needs to be done on the decision making process used by experts when studying foreign models for adaptation internally. The development of guidelines to be used would be helpful to officials charged with adapting a foreign model to a domestic system.

To understand better the CU in Venezuela, further study needs to be done concerning the process in deciding questions about: curriculum, budget, personnel, student services, and capital outlay. This study should

be done with an on-site visit utilizing a carefully constructed interview guide. All the public CU should be visited.

Continued monitoring of the development of short-cycle postsecondary education is needed to ascertain the success or failure of the system, especially the CU, to solve its problems with articulation, graduate placement, and public image.

The Bowles model is a useful guideline in describing higher educational development in Third World nations. But it should be compared to higher educational development in more Third World nations and the appropriate refinements made, especially in the last three stages. With further research, the model could be even more useful for higher education planners and practitioners.

APPENDIX A
INTERVIEWEES

1. Professor Indalecio Gasique M., Director of Planning, Colegio Universitario Región Capital Los Teques.

2. Licenciado Laura Boyer E., Academic Dean, Colegio Universitario Francisco de Miranda, Caracas.

3. Licenciado Milena De Lotelo, Director, Colegio Universitario Francisco de Mirando.

4. Licenciado Juan E. Torres C., Director, Instituto Universitario Pedagógico Experimental "J. M. Siso Martinez," Caracas.

5. Profesor Gilberto Picon M., Director, Instituto Universitario Pedagógico de Caracas.

6. Mr. David L. Grey, United States Embassy Cultural Officer, Caracas.

7. Licenciado Alberto S. Armitano N., Director, Educredito, Caracas.

8. Profesor José R. Mata, Director of Development, Colegio Universitario Región Capital Los Teques.

9. Licenciado Alfonso Level Herrera, Director, Colegio Universitario de Caracas.

10. Licenciado Lorenzo Monroy, Former Minister of Education; Director of Centro Venezolano Americano, Caracas.

11. Licenciado Aurora Guerra, Assistant Director of Superior Education, Ministry of Education, Caracas.

12. Beatriz M. Vetencourt Herrera, Alberto Duque, Jesús S. Perdigón, Wilma Eulació L., Four students, Colegio Universitario Región Capital Los Teques.

13. Licenciado María Auxiliadora de Moncayo, Coordinator for Pre-school Teaching, Colegio Universitario Región Capital Los Teques.

14. Profesora María Quintana, Assistant to the Minister of Middle Education, Ministry of Education, Caracas.

15. Profesora Dinoer Guaido, Statistician, Oficina de Planificación del Sector Universitario, Consejo Nacional de Universidades, Caracas.

16. Dra. Elizabeth Y. de Caldera, Coordinator of Master's Degree Program in Population, University of Simón Rodríguez, Caracas.

17. Licenciado Arturo Navas Gómez, Vice-President of University Simón Rodríguez, Caracas.

18. Licenciado Marisabel Tovar D., Coordinator for the Department of Student Assistance, Colegio Universitario Francisco de Miranda.

19. Profesora Judith de Heredia, Instructor, Colegio Universitario Francisco de Miranda.

20. Profesora Lilian Martínez de Parra, Coordinator for Curriculum and Instruction Program, Colegio Universitario Francisco de Miranda.

21. Licenciado Uvylerma Agotti de Samaned, Instructor, Colegio Universitario Francisco de Miranda.

22. Licenciado Ismael Silva Fuenzalida, Technical Assistant, Instituto Nacional de Cooperación Educativa, Caracas.

23. Profesora Graciela Moore, Official, The Open University, Caracas.

24. Profesora Maritza Ferrer de López, Official, Dirección General de Educación Superior, Ministry of Education.

25. Profesora María Azócar, Official, Office of Planning, Colegio Universitario Francisco de Miranda.

26. Mr. Virgil Haney, EXXON Consultant, Lagoven, Caracas.

APPENDIX B
INTERVIEW GUIDE

1. Where did the idea for the colegios universitarios originate? Was there extensive foreign influence in the development of these institutions? Was this influence direct and in what form?

2. There seems to have been widespread political support for the colegios universitarios. What do you attribute this to any why? To what extent was there opposition?

3. The University Reform Law of 1970 and the restructuring of the secondary system earlier was extensive. What kind of influence did these events have on the creation of the colegios universitarios?

4. There has been tremendous growth in the number of students eligible for higher education in Venezuela. Were colegios universitarios created to help meet this growth instead of expanding existing universities?

5. How do colegios universitarios fit into the overall plan for continued economic development in Venezuela?

6. To what extent were the existing universities in favor of/opposed to the creation of colegios universitarios?

7. Was the creation of colegios universitarios due to the desire to democratize higher education, that is to provide higher education to non-traditional segments of the student population? Were colegios universitarios also created to provide non-traditional types of higher education to students?

8. Have there been any basic changes in the goals/purposes of colegios universitarios since their inception?

9. What do you see as the main advantages of the system of colegios universitarios?

10. Why is it that articulation agreements between the colegios universitarios and the universities are not more common?

11. What suggestions would you give other Third World nations who may be interested in developing short-cycle postsecondary higher education?

APPENDIX C
SPANISH INTERVIEW GUIDE

1. ¿Cómo se originó la idea de la creación de los colegios universitarios? ¿Hubo alguna influencia extrangera en esa decisión? Cual? ¿En que sentido tuvo dado esa influencia: a) en el diseño, b) en la implementación o, c) en el contratacion de los técnicos?

2. ¿En que sentido los diverentes partidos politícos a apoyaron la idea de la creación de los colegios universitarios?

3. ¿En que sentido la reforma universitaria de año 1970 influencío, en la educación secundaria, y en la creación de los colegios universitarios?

4. ¿En que sentido la creación de los colegios universitarios solucionará el problema del excesivo numero de estudiantes que deseaban entrar en educación superior y por razones de cupo no pudieron? ¿Por que razones se crearon los colegios universitarios en vez de abrir otros universidades?

5. ¿Hasta que punto los colegios universitarios han producido fuentes de trabajo para los egresados? Cuales fueron algunas implicaciones para el desarrollo nacional?

6. ¿En el momento de la creación de los colegios universitarios estaban de acuerdo las universidades al respecto?

7. ¿Entre los factores que influenciaron el la creación de los colegios universitarios estaban: a) el de democratizar la educación superior o, b) el de ofrecer un tipo de educación no tradicional para los estudiantes universitarios?

8. ¿Qué cambios se han producido en los colegios universitarios en la relación a metas u objectivos desde que éstos se crearon?

9. ¿Cualés han sido algunas de las ventajas en la creación de los colegios universitarios y las universidades?

10. ¿Cualés son los factores que han alterado la articulación entre (el paso entre) los colegios universitarios y las universidades?

11. ¿Que surerencias pudieron Ud. dar a las Naciones del Tercer Mundo se desean crear un ciclo corto o colegios universitarios?

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I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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